TRANSLATING THE RANGE VOTE INTO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (Using Bicam III)

Linked from 'BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM' page

http://www.commonwealthparty.net/electoralcollege.htm#links











Revised: 7/10/12


Textual change for more clarity in Fig. 5 and for the in-house page's description within concerning examples of inclusive C.A.S.S Summation overlays.


What to do with a state's alloted electors for presidential districts when the state does not utilize presidential districts because of gerrymandering concerns. (Section IX, new first paragraph)


A dimension of the C.A.S.S Summation has been increased and more participants in the fourth quadrants have been added in order to achieve correct balance between popular and state legislature input towards assignment of a state's electors.












Hypertext Outline


























I. Mission


We now consider how we would translate the results of a presidential election utilizing a range (or score) vote to the electoral college. Specifically we here use Bicameral Electoral College III. In order to do this, we will take into account attributes of the range vote and how its expression differs from that of a plurality vote. Acknowledging such mechanics will help determine how to carry over the appropriate meaning or expression of the range vote to the electoral college.










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II. Case Against Contemporary Plurality Voting


We first notice that in plurality voting, every vote cast by each individual has the same weight. Whether one is extremely happy with a candidate, generally content with a candidate's adequacy, mildly supports the candidate or even holds their nose to vote for the candidate -- all those votes carry the same weight in the election. This is the effect of granting only one vote per person. A voter has to put their only one-or-nothing vote towards a single candidate. There is no way to express a preferential ranking across all candidates. So voters are cornered into effectively expressing the same amounts of preference for their settled-upon candidates despite individuals having different levels of support for their "favorite" runner. In the plurality system no nuances or subtleties are evident. No truer reflective, flexible proportions of sentiment are allowed. And not only are they denied ability to assign preferential ranking to the candidates, the two-party system implements harsh ballot access and distorting campaign finance laws that limit the number of candidates to choose from which suppresses the election's ability to exhibit competitively true voting blocks. This is done not just because of the need of the current plurality system to achieve a simple majority (or threshold plurality), but also because of the desire of the powers that be to herd the people.

Without a greater selection of viable candidates, voters are less able to cast their one vote for a party or candidate that may better fit their ideals so they are often forced or intimidated into bluntly voting the lesser of evils. It is not surprising if voters wish they could have supported someone else instead of succumbing merely to electability concerns. Accordingly, we note that a plurality system allowing for more candidates with more open competition and possessing further reforms like the granting of the power upon generally smaller third-party "spoiler" candidates to assign their ballot capital to one of the leading contesting-majority candidates (or towards determining such) would provide for more accurate and better resolved representation.




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III. Range Voting and Some Advantages


Achieving a better level of representation is the range or score vote which allows a voter to rate each candidate from say, either zero to nine or zero to ninety-nine for more precision. The winning candidate is the one who achieves the highest average score across all their received voter input. A candidate not known to the voter or of which the voter has no opinion is given a neutral rating by that voter which does not impact that candidate's average in the race. As well, there are some caveats concerning some special conditions and anomalies that prevent fringe candidates from gaining office under statistically absurd circumstances.

Range voting is inherently more expressive and better selects a winning candidate towards a more widespread satisfaction of the electorate. With range voting there can be no "justification" as there is now for overly restrictive ballot access laws. Plus a range system accepts write-in candidates and has notable transfer compatibility with current voting machines. Voters will be much better able to put forth their true wants in range voting with the ability to rank all candidates in desirability while allowing for a wider slate of runners. This awards a winner more in accord with an intrinsic consensus derived from across the electorate as opposed to the blunt, boxed-in system we have now.




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IV. State Electors by Plurality & Range -- quadrants, c.a.s.s, F3o4Qs


When using the plurality election system with the more developed version of our bicameral electoral college, we plug a state's particular relative election tallies for the candidates directly into three of four of what we will here call quadrants. These quadrants are constructed by the highest version of the bicameral electoral college, namely (Bicam III). Two of the quadrants are the state legislature's house vote and the state senate vote. The other two quadrants are the statewide popular vote and the state popular vote by presidential districts. (figure 1) Each presidential district within the fourth quadrant is awarded to a sole victor as opposed to reporting numerical tallies of the candidates as done in the other three quadrants. When the election results come in, we just overlay the relative tallies (or districts for the fourth quadrant) onto the allotted virtual electors within a quadrant and proceed from there.

Now if we conduct a range vote on the ground for a presidential election, do we similarly overlay the relative proportions of candidate average scores (c.a.s.s) in like fashion concerning the first three of four quadrants (F3o4Qs)? (figure 2) No because this allows distortion of the intentioned overlay as compared from quadrant to quadrant from amongst one or more states' F3o4Qs. One can see this by imagining two quadrants of a state (indexed the same # electors) where all candidates occupying both happen to have the same average scores while one quadrant holds some extra candidate scores. At overlay the quadrant containing the extra candidate(s) would index fewer virtual electors to its dittoed candidates. Does not the meaning of the range vote grant the same amount of preference to the double occupants? Yet their virtual electors will differ. This is because any extra candidate "eats" some of its own quadrant's associated overlay pie, leaving less for the others in the same quadrant to have. Because of this and other reasons, we do not yet overlay any c.a.s.s proportions. Instead, we will perform a weighted summation of all state F3o4Qs' c.a.s.s which will reflect the correct aggregate c.a.s.s proportions of those quadrants and states. Then we exercise an adjustment on the summation which will make it possible to properly overlay the desired and relevant aggregate c.a.s.s proportions onto a collection of virtual electors designated for all the states' F3o4Qs within a computer program.

Before going further we observe another distortion that the weighted summation will correct. Imagine two quadrants of a state (again indexed same # electors) that happen to hold c.a.s.s for a string of the same candidates. Further, neither quadrant holds any extras. Suppose too that all the c.a.s.s within one quadrant are relative to each other in certain proportions. Picture too that in the other quadrant all the c.a.s.s are relative to each other in the same proportions but at the same time each candidate's average score is the same multiple of their score in the previous quadrant. Let's say for example each candidate's score in the second quadrant is twice as high as in the first quadrant. If we were to overlay the relative c.a.s.s for each quadrant onto its allotted virtual electors, we would end up with the same number of electors for the same candidate in each quadrant yet the second quadrant displayed twice the support or enthusiasm of its audience or constituency towards each candidate. The weighted summation however would log the difference in enthusiasm between the two quadrants properly. We reference the distortion of enthusiasm as 'scale distortion' and the distortion described above as the 'extra candidate distortion' should they come up in discussion.


We now make explicit definition of the proposed summation for further reference:






C.A.S.S SUMMATION


State 1: (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) x (State 1's # Bicam III electors) +
State 2: (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) x (State 2's # Bicam III electors) +
State 3: (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) x (State 3's # Bicam III electors) +

...etc. on up to......

State 50: (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) x (State 50's # Bicam III electors) +
D.C.: (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) x (D.C.'s # Bicam III electors)





Where Q1, Q2, Q3 are the contained candidate average scores (c.a.s.s) reported by those quadrants of that particular state. Nebraska and D.C.'s respective Q1 & Q2 are analogous representations of their government structures. Note multiplying (Q1 + Q2 + 2 · Q3) by its state's number of Bicam III electors provides the relative standing of that state's F3o4Qs input towards the national result. Multiplying them all by 3/4 is not necessary since we are here interested only in the end proportions which would remain the same. The explanation for doubling Q3 follows.....












Since the initial posting, we have doubled the input of the third quadrants in the C.A.S.S Summation definition above to correct the balance between a state's popular vote and its legislative vote. In Bicam III, the popular vote and the legislative vote within a state have equal weight towards the determination of its elector slate. The earlier version C.A.S.S Summation using (Q1 + Q2 + Q3) for each state was not truly balanced as originally thought. That initially conceived range vote input for a state incorporated the impression that having all the Quadrant 3s as a third participant constituency in the all state F3o4Qs' range vote result would in the end through the addend of all the Q4s still properly reflect equal legislative and popular suffrage, but that is not correct and is too much along the lines of plurality-based thinking. It is more accurate to say that all the Q3s' input was outweighed 2:1 by the Q1s and Q2s in the all state F3o4Qs' range vote. Thus the legislative vote by all the state houses and senates did not equally share power with the statewide popular voices towards the lead range candidate(s) for 3/4 of the end national electoral slate. Yes, the fourth quadrants appeared to make up for that afterwards but that again was a vestige of plurality thinking a la Bicam III. Instead, the Q4s would have been more likely relegated after the fact to just throwing relative weights about the more legislatures-influenced F3o4Qs' top two favorites towards first or second place.

So the legislative vote did indeed carry too much weight and every whole fourth quadrant being devoted to a state's popular range vote by district did not adequately compensate in the end. However, with the newer dimensions in the C.A.S.S Summation we see immediately that giving twice the power to Q3 balances its share against the combination of Q1 and Q2. As well, we will change the participants in a state's fourth quadrant to maintain balance. How? We shall split it half between popular voice and legislators of a state. The fourth quadrant is still to be based on district victors via range vote result but only half of the fourth quadrant will now carry the original presidential district results. The other half of the fourth quadrant will be split equally, one side containing victors via the range votes of individual state representatives and the other by individual state senators. Do we need to parcel associated districts for this? No, we don't have to. A state house already has districts for its representatives. The state senate acts as if the senators' constituencies are districts whether they are or not. So all we have to do is look at the range vote input from each individual state representative or senator and that determines which candidate receives the electors allotted to each legislator's representational district. (figure 3)

Now we ponder the proper way to eventually apply the C.A.S.S Summation towards the real world electoral college's electors. Again considering the pattern from the original plurality system Bicam III application, at overall election result we could there just overlay the candidates' particular relative tallies and carried district proportions onto a Bicam III software model's virtual electors corresponding to the designated quadrants for each state. Then by computer we just swapped and combined from such assigned allocations between the states so that as many claimed virtual electors as possible became whole and unanimous while all the virtual electors together still represented the candidates' same national proportions. After that we used a process to best determine a final unanimous assignment for each campaign-declared or the remaining disparate subset comprised of whole mixed-share electors. We then re-distributed such that all claimed electors were back under the current nominal elector allotments decreed for each state by the Constitution in order to carry out their corresponding real world function. We are going to attempt a version of all this for the range vote but instead we will perform the C.A.S.S Summation with a necessary adjustment applied to its end result within the computer program. From there is where we overlay the desired aggregate c.a.s.s proportions onto the designated number of virtual electors representing all states' F3o4Qs. The fourth quadrants' district proportions are determined according to each district's victor via range vote and their virtual electors overlayed accordingly for all states.* Once both tasks are completed, we then handle swapping or combining towards the highest possible number of whole and unanimous virtual electors. Then we perform unanimous processing upon the campaign-directed subsets of whole mixed-share electors and same for the disparate in order to carry out the subsequent nominal re-distribution of all claimed electors back to the states towards real world function.





*FOURTH QUADRANT'S DISTRICT OVERLAY FOR A STATE:

(Each candidate's proportion of districts won by range vote in the state) X
(A fourth of the state's # Bicam III electors)





MORE SPECIFICALLY:

(Each candidate's proportion of state rep.s___ won by range vote in the state) X
(A sixteenth of the state's # Bicam III electors)

+

(Each candidate's proportion of state sen.s___ won by range vote in the state) X
(A sixteenth of the state's # Bicam III electors)

+

(Each candidate's proportion of pres. districts won by range vote in the state) X
(An eighth__ of the state's # Bicam III electors)











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V. Example of Candidates A, B & C Illustrates Inclusive Overlay of C.A.S.S Summation a Folly


We must invoke an adjustment within the computer program before further application of the C.A.S.S Summation and especially before any assigned happenings in the real world electoral college due to the nature of the range vote. Going either by a straight overlay of all c.a.s.s proportions onto their quadrant-designated virtual electors or the inclusive overlay of the C.A.S.S Summation ratios onto virtual electors for all states' F3o4Qs both as if using the plurality system would in the end, albeit to different degrees, distort the range vote's transferred meaning and intent as well as the electoral college's role in encouraging the coalescing towards the more truly favored or lead candidates to compete for a majority.

We now derive the adjustment by observing how inclusively overlaying all the aggregate c.a.s.s proportions of the C.A.S.S Summation onto the virtual electors corresponding to all the states' F3o4Qs and then processing towards the actual electoral college via the computer program can easily stack the outcome away from the range vote's intended winner (and by extension the best alternate). This observation will be done by an example presidential election between candidates A, B & C. Remember that the the extra candidate and scale distortions discussed earlier in section IV (2nd & 3rd paragraphs) are filtered out by use of the C.A.S.S Summation. This approach will allow us to totally focus on the distorting effects of the underdog candidate(s) as opposed to either of those section IV distorting effects which would occur if we were directly overlaying the c.a.s.s proportions onto the virtual electors of each quadrant.

So now observing the three candidate example, suppose candidate A does cumulatively best in the C.A.S.S Summation. We also find the values of the aggregate c.a.s.s in the summation gives candidate A 190 score units while candidates B & C get 143 and 101 score units respectively. The ratios of those values will be what is to initially populate the set-aside proportion of virtual electors representing the summated F3o4Qs of all states in the computer program. The rest of the virtual electors are for the fourth quadrants' district proportions by range vote. Half are indexed to the state popular range vote by presidential districts and the other half split equally by the state senators' and representatives' individual range vote victors. Once the virtuals have been entered, combine and swap from all to obtain the greatest number of whole and unanimous virtual electors assigned amongst the candidates. Any remaining scrap whole mixed-share electors are grouped into mutual subsets with a possible disparate and assigned to victors using the applicable stages of the Process. Now how would candidate A fare when the final resulting virtual electors are transferred to the real electoral college under this scenario? We follow through here using some improvisation:







ELECTORS FOR CANDIDATES A, B & C



For obtaining candidate proportions based upon the C.A.S.S Summation:
190 score units + 143 score units + 101 score units = 434 score unit denominator



Candidate's elector proportion of the C.A.S.S Summation's overlay {or of the summated F3o4Qs overlay}:
(That candidate's score units) / 434 score units

Candidate A: 190/434 = 0.437788_
Candidate B: 143/434 = 0.329493_
Candidate C: 101/434 = 0.2327188






Electoral College electors: 538



Virtual electors allotted for all states' F3o4Qs {or C.A.S.S Summation's overlay}:
538 X (3 Quadrants / 4 Quadrants) = 403.5



Virtual electors initialized to hold the legislative & presidential district proportions of all states:
538 / 4 = 134.5
(or 538 - 403.5 = 134.5)



Candidate's electoral allotment concerning the summated F3o4Qs overlay:
403.5 X (Candidate's elector proportion of the summated F3o4Qs overlay)

Candidate A: 403.5 * (190/434) = 176.64745_ electors
Candidate B: 403.5 * (143/434) = 132.95042_ electors
Candidate C: 403.5 * (101/434) = 093.902035 electors






Every candidate's proportion of fourth quadrants' legislative & presidential districts:
{For this demonstration, we merely surmise some proportions which would seem to fit in with the scenario described.}

Candidate A: 60%
Candidate B: 30%
Candidate C: 10%




Electors for every candidate's share of fourth quadrants' legislative & presidential districts:

Candidate A: 134.5 * 0.6 = 80.70 electors
Candidate B: 134.5 * 0.3 = 40.35 electors
Candidate C: 134.5 * 0.1 = 13.45 electors






Every candidate's virtual number of whole electors and partials of mixed-share electors through combining their allotment of the F3o4Qs' national summation overlay and their fourth quadrant district shares:

Candidate A: 176.64745_ + 80.70 = 257.34745 electors
Candidate B: 132.95042_ + 40.35 = 173.30042 electors
Candidate C: 093.902035 + 13.45 = 107.35203 electors






So....



Using Process to determine scrap, mixed-share electors we finally get something like....


A: 257 electors

B: 173 electors

C: 108* electors




* Candidate C gains elector by processing of the scrap whole mixed-share elector.





anchor for figure's text link
Repeat Calculation






Candidate A, the winner by a noticeable margin in the more expressive range vote with 190 score units for the summated F3o4Qs to B and C's significantly lesser showings and with sufficient favor in the fourth quadrant's presidential (by popular voice) and legislative districts should in the end also take the electoral college decisively to reflect the range vote's better choice for winner. Yet candidate A does not reach an electoral college majority of 270 to guarantee a win. Alas, candidates B & C can coalesce to form a decisive majority out of their combined 281 electors for candidate B. Where B & C are ideologically closer to each other and both are farther away from A, (figure 4) then it is a terrible upset to the electorate who favored A over B & C in the range vote by good amount. It is not really the electoral college's fault though, the coalescing of B & C is a result of an otherwise desired function concerning the overlay of plurality voting situations. It is actually the initial overlay of all the C.A.S.S Summation's candidate ratios onto the virtual electors designated for the summation of the states' F3o4Qs and their eventual processing into the real electoral college that is to blame. Even though B & C were well behind by the range vote, putting both of their C.A.S.S Summation ratios into the initial virtual electors of the plurality-functioning electoral college gives B & C exaggerated elector voting blocks that squash A.

Considering this particular example, (figure 5) if the election between A, B and C had been in a plurality system granting proportional state electors, then B would have gotten fewer electors & C would have gotten substantially fewer electors. One reason is because voters for B & C could not concurrently cast range votes to rank each other's candidate higher. As well, B is a more established candidate with more funding than C. Also the fear of a split of that ideological faction's vote favors B over C. Candidate A could have taken proportionally more of the single votes cast by voters between A & B due to their limited ability of casting only one vote for only one candidate along with being ideologically more dispersed towards A. So in such a plurality vote scenario, a direct overlay of its tallies with sufficiently favoring presidential district proportions to the electoral college could have granted candidate A the majority in the electoral college with B as a leading secondary challenger.

You may wish to visit an in-house page to see other examples along this ideological spread with some change in B & C's voter cluster amounts. Those particular examples illustrate how inclusive overlay of the candidates' C.A.S.S Summation ratios can taint the electoral college results away from the best candidate of the election's range vote.




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VI. Hammering Out the Adjustment to the C.A.S.S Summation


All this tells us that the needed elimination adjustment should preserve or defend an electoral college advantage within the designated electors for the highest range vote candidate(s) of the C.A.S.S Summation and provide parameters for the expression of the more underdog candidate(s) which deny them the means to hijack the show through coalescing any undue plurality proportions resulting from their possible overlay into the electoral college. We note too that the electoral college seeks to determine a winning candidate by a majority while the range vote ranks all candidates by highest order of broad appeal -- granting victory to the highest. In light of all these arguments, seeking to combine both virtues by reflecting such range vote proportions into the electoral college asks for a specific limitation on the number of the resulting underdogs since allowing a higher number of them may more likely grant enough competitive electoral room relative to the lead candidate and thus alter or capture that lead's advantage and the majority final outcome.

A majority requires over half the constituency while range vote rankings allow for secondary candidates to accrue substantial totals relative to the lead, easily threatening any such majorities in an inclusive electoral college overlay. Such vulnerability invites the diabolical method of a faction running clone candidates in order to achieve or hog as many of those substantial secondary proportions involved in underdog overlay -- thereby getting a greater chance of success in hijacking the final result the more underdogs allowed entry. Thus, to best preserve the advantage of the lead(s) of the range vote in all situations and for consistency -- we allow for only the highest two range vote candidates of the C.A.S.S Summation to reflect their range vote proportions into the designated virtual electors for the states' F3o4Qs which are to be processed towards the final electoral college.

Through candidate A's experience above we have seen how providing the expression of more underdogs can deny a just majority about a lead candidate's reflective range vote proportion in the electoral college. Overlaying only the relative standings of the highest two candidates in the C.A.S.S Summation should provide a failsafe elector tilt heavily influencing a final outcome. The case for such has been made through all these arguments against furthering exaggerated or potentially undue plurality proportions granted in the electoral college on behalf of lesser underdogs through overlay.

We now officially define the elimination adjustment in order to meet the desired conditions.....








The relative proportions of only the two highest candidates' range vote score accumulations from the C.A.S.S Summation will be overlayed into the virtual electors allotted for all states' F3o4Qs.












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VII. Further Observation, Justification, Comparison & Theory of Adjustment


After application and overlay of the Adjustment, all the states' fourth quadrants' legislative & presidential district relative outcome results will be overlayed according to their Bicam III proportions into the remaining virtual electoral college electors. (figure 6) Then after swapping amongst all the virtuals to achieve the highest number of unanimous wholes and performing subset processing, the final elector assignments are nominally redistributed back to the states. This is where the more marginal campaigns coalesce about the lead candidates or perhaps in certain situations lead candidates emerge for which the real electors have mostly decided to vote for on the appropriate day of the actual electoral college.

In adhering to the Adjustment, we have stopped elector inclusion for the F3o4Qs' designation in the virtual electoral college after a clear second place challenger in order to lean towards a decisive majority in the greater electoral college influenced by the show of the highest candidate in the F3o4Qs' C.A.S.S Summation vs. subsequent weighing-in of the Q4s. The political range vote itself gives no concessions to lesser candidates in awarding office so one challenger in the F3o4Qs' slate is sufficient in at least mere expression. Applying the Adjustment to the earlier example using candidates A, B & C means that C will now have no electors within the F3o4Qs' designation. Candidates A and B will inhabit that elector space using their overlay ratio from the C.A.S.S Summation which was 190 and 143 respectively.

Here are the elector results for candidates A, B & C updated with the applied Adjustment:







ELECTORS FOR CANDIDATES A, B & C VIA ADJUSTMENT



For obtaining the candidate proportions for the two highest candidates based upon the adjusted C.A.S.S Summation:
190 score units + 143 score units = 333 score unit denominator



Two highest candidates' elector proportions of the adjusted C.A.S.S Summation's overlay {or of the adjusted F3o4Qs summation overlay}:
(Each highest candidate's score units) / 333 score units

Candidate A: 190/333 = 0.5705705
Candidate B: 143/333 = 0.4294294






Electoral College electors: 538



Virtual electors allotted for all states' F3o4Qs {or adjusted C.A.S.S Summation's overlay}:
538 X (3 Quadrants / 4 Quadrants) = 403.5



Virtual electors initialized to hold the legislative & presidential district proportions of all states:
538 / 4 = 134.5
(or 538 - 403.5 = 134.5)



Two highest candidates' electoral allotments concerning F3o4Qs' adjusted national summation overlay:
403.5 X (High candidate's elector proportion of the adjusted F3o4Qs summation overlay)

Candidate A: 403.5 * (190/333) = 230.22519 electors
Candidate B: 403.5 * (143/333) = 173.27476 electors






Every candidate's proportion of fourth quadrants' legislative & presidential districts:
{For this demonstration, we merely surmise some proportions which would seem to fit in with the scenario described.}

Candidate A: 60%
Candidate B: 30%
Candidate C: 10%




Electors for every candidate's share of fourth quadrants' legislative & presidential districts:

Candidate A: 134.5 * 0.6 = 80.70 electors
Candidate B: 134.5 * 0.3 = 40.35 electors
Candidate C: 134.5 * 0.1 = 13.45 electors






Every candidate's virtual number of whole electors and partials of mixed-share electors through combining their allotment of the F3o4Qs' adjusted national summation overlay and their fourth quadrant district shares:

Candidate A: 230.22519 + 80.70 = 310.92519 electors
Candidate B: 173.27476 + 40.35 = 213.62476 electors
Candidate C: 000.00000 + 13.45 = 013.45000 electors






So....



Using Process to determine scrap, mixed-share electors we finally get something like....


A: 310 electors

B: 215* electors

C: 13 electors




* Candidate B gains two electors by processing of the scrap whole mixed-share electors.






Repeat Calculation






We do not have to worry about any of the candidates whose range vote accumulations of the C.A.S.S Summation lie outside the boundary of the Adjustment and are thus not included in the F3o4Qs' designation within the virtual electoral college. (Candidate C for this example.) This is because unlike with plurality voting in presidential elections, range voters here for those candidates could concurrently vote or rate other candidates on the ballot which gave those voters more of a voice in who the relevant, final leading two candidates of the F3o4Qs' field would be. Their expression towards the determination of the final two candidates is already built-in to the range vote prior to any electoral college allocations. That is to say there is an advantage compared to a plurality vote system. In plurality we should include all candidates' electorate proportions in the electoral college assignments in order to best steer to a final victor via its herded voters for main & middle candidates and the spoilers' boxed-in shares. This inclusion partially compensates for the limited representations put upon all the ideological camps, political cliques and candidate groupies. Such steering is the best as possible when stuck with the limited and boxed-in plurality vote's one-vote-per-person conditions.

Here in this particular adjusted range system, the eventual order for the two lead candidates of the Adjustment overlay could be altered by the outcome of the presidential & legislative districts in the fourth quadrants. Part of it depends on how close the F3o4Qs' two lead candidate overlays are. Again all these results happen by concurrent voting choices offered to all the electorate in the range vote. Our Adjustment narrows the subsequent & plurality-driven electoral college's main focus to cast towards the relevant and leading two candidates who are to likely fulfill the majority and main secondary challenger outcome positions. For any differences in electoral allocations or final result between both as herein described the range vote's electoral college and the plurality vote's electoral college, one should accept the range vote's as more preferable in practice since it is more expressive, representational and accurate. That would seem to be the case as well generally for comparably valid configurations between the two.

Note that it is allowable to have the plurality and this range vote translation method both take place in the Bicam III electoral college state-by-state. To do so, the states employing the range vote for president would limit the C.A.S.S Summation to themselves and likewise invoke a local application of the Adjustment to those results -- retaining the resulting overlay only to virtual electors corresponding to those states' F3o4Qs. The other states' virtual electors reflecting their F3o4Qs would just contain those relative plurality tally overlays. Particular fourth quadrants would contain relative districts won by candidates in that particular state by either the plurality or range vote methods -- whichever the state employs. The federal laptop would then swap & combine about all virtuals in order to apply the Process and nominal redistribution. The resulting electors can then coalesce about favored or lead candidates based upon the electoral accumulations of that electoral college as a whole. This allows us to implement presidential range voting state-by-state as opposed to having to wait for it to become convention in all the states at once.




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VIII. Ties


Though not likely for range voting, if there is an exact or statistical tie amongst candidates concerning any of the two lead positions called for by the Adjustment upon the C.A.S.S Summation and neglecting when the tie is amongst just two candidates for first place, we resort to an order of preference to settle the position(s) amongst them. When they do not mutually agree to a settlement themselves, then the relevant Congressional body's range vote survey {Senate when choosing Vice President, House when choosing President} concerning the tied candidates in question determines which candidate gets the virtual electors overlay. Should such a body's survey be undecisive or ties remain with no mutual agreement, then the Supreme Court will decide from amongst any remaining tied candidates by its own range vote survey and/or a straight vote. If that fails or still any unmutual ties not extinguished, the remaining tied candidates in question will draw lots.

Remember in using either the plurality or range vote system, whoever is the clear winner of a presidential district (or legislative in range system) solely gains its overlay share of electors. When setting up the basics on the Bicameral Electoral College Reform page, a particular Bicam I section said: 'Note that when the results of a race in a particular district do not yield a (threshold) majority or a threshold plurality victor, that district's allotment will simply resort to the popular vote proportions for the candidates in that district.' We now ask what if there is a tie of two threshold pluralities? In such cases the electors should be divvied equally amongst just the tied candidates in question. Now how about fourth quadrant presidential & legislative districts determined by range votes with leading range ties? The analogous will not apply. That is because we wish here to limit any undue preference in the translation to the virtual electors due to the multiplying effects of any possible clone candidates. Those clone candidates eat more share of the district's elector pie on behalf of the clones' particular faction or ideology just like the extra candidates did in the 'extra candidate distortion' described in section IV, 2nd paragraph. As well, clone candidates split a faction or ideology's tally in plurality systems which can cost a potential victorious candidate an election over there. Thus, various groups may seek to underhandedly present clone candidates in order to water down rivals in those systems. Such rivals can lose due to the mere existence of those mirror candidates and such result invites diabolical attempts at this mischief where more feasible.

While a range vote generally cancels incentive and grants immunity against clone candidates, translation of certain c.a.s.s proportions to the virtual electors can bring such threat back into the system, albeit with less prediction and thus less opportunism beforehand or perhaps more by coincidence or of true grassroots efforts. When range tied, divvied-equally district overlay occurs, any clone candidates would pile on similar to the underdog distortion as described in section V, getting a noticeably larger share of a district's electors towards the clones' agenda and shrinking the electoral shares of the more unique candidate(s). So instead of granting equal virtual elector shares amongst a district's range lead-tied candidates which would "gang-up" the clones against the more unique one(s), we resort to another way to settle ties which differs from the threshold plurality's tie solution mentioned above. Such change of method would hold great significance should the tied district(s) in question determine the presidency. The method will not be to weed the clones out though, since it is too subjective to declare which particular candidate(s) are more unique and who of the others is the original and who are the clones. Note too though, that carrying divided tallies from plurality vote systems into the electoral college is acceptable since those proportions can (re)coalesce towards a lead candidate or ideological end.

Assuming no mutual agreements amongst the tied camps, one method to settle a range-tied district could involve treating the district like a county commissioner district divvied by a state senatorial boundary and analogizing how candidates for county commissioner within would determine state senator. This approach is from the 'Bicameral Electoral College Reform' page in the section under Bicam II called 'Appointing State Senators Via Senatorial Districts'. The analogy here would instead use particular shares of congressional contenders from the most recent or concurrent election occurring within the district and applying the range vote survey input of those contenders concerning the tied presidential candidates -- riding that upon those relative shares. This is much like how a subset victor is determined in the Process. However, while this approach would utilize district sovereign voice albeit indirectly towards presidential choice, it may be too involved or stale to track and implement. A more indepth description may be posted later for analysis. Until then we may resort to the tried-and-true which is the usual fall-back involving an outside body to break the tie. That would be a Congressional body's range vote survey on the presidential candidates concerning the range-tied ones for the district in question. The House range vote survey is used for district choice of president and the Senate's for vice-presidential choice. Should this not resolve it then the usual order of preference occurs as mentioned above in the first paragraph of this section VIII starting around the second sentence and which can be followed ditto from there for this situation.

Even if the congressional bodies should still be prone to better chance of picking any clones perhaps due to their attentioned prevalence, being an official governing body having to possibly govern with the selected presidential candidate should allow for some higher level of discernment that better categorizes the candidates. This would especially apply if their choice on behalf of the district determined the next president. This fall-back mimics the constitutional role of the congressional bodies in the latter stage of breaking a hung or tied electoral college but without quorums.

A lead range-tied legislative district can be resolved by the particular state legislator picking a favorite out of his own tied range vote input. However if they cannot do that for some reason, they can recuse and submit their ties to whatever method described above is in vogue.

Again, as the range vote site states that ties are rare, nonetheless we present these arguments just in case for completion.




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IX. Bizarre Circumstances


When a state does not utilize presidential districts due to gerrymandering concerns, we make assignments for the allotted electors intended for presidential districts by inspiration of the method used for the legislative districts as described in section IV, 2nd to last paragraph. So we act on the range vote input from each voter of the popular vote similar to that of each legislator in that part of section IV by tallying the favorite or highest ranking candidate ballot by ballot. The proportions of those tallied favorites are then overlayed onto the electors of the state originally intended for presidential districts. This treats every individual voter as a district unto themselves. If a popular voter's ballot has leading range ties, we include a way on the ballot for the voter to settle for a favorite out of those. When no such indication is made, then that ballot has no effect on the tally concerning the individual favorites.

In case of interim death or sufficient scandal or any such disqualifying drama about any candidate with assigned electors, such electors may decide to vote for their favored alternates. A further thought: So even though the range vote better expresses the most desired winner for all participants, we are still with this translation able to utilize theoretical electoral college override to counter some perceived bad whims of the electorate, belay a soured result or carry out a strategic vote but all through or dependent upon the electors afforded the candidates by this paradigm.




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X. Figures


FIG. 1~ YOUR STATE'S PLURALITY VOTE
ELECTOR SLATE

Quadrant 1

State House Vote
relative candidate
tallies

Quadrant 2

State Senate Vote
relative candidate
tallies

Quadrant 3

Statewide Popular Vote
relative candidate
tallies

Quadrant 4

State Popular Vote
by Presidential District
(# districts won by plurality vote each candidate)

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FIG. 2~ YOUR STATE'S INITIALLY CONCEIVED
LOG OF ITS RANGE VOTE ELECTOR SLATE

(Pink highlighting F3o4Qs)

Quadrant 1

State House Vote
c.a.s.s ?


Quadrant 2

State Senate Vote
c.a.s.s ?


Quadrant 3

Statewide Popular Vote
c.a.s.s ?


Quadrant 4

State Popular Vote
by Presidential District
(# districts won by range vote each candidate)

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FIG. 3~ YOUR STATE'S LOG OF ITS
RANGE VOTE ELECTOR SLATE

(Pink highlighting F3o4Qs,
Fourth Quadrant lower right)


3/4 of Slate

c.a.s.s of:

Quadrant 1 + Quadrant 2 +

( 2 X Quadrant 3 )



# State Rep.s
won by
range vote
each candidate

# State Senators
won by
range vote
each candidate

# Presidential Districts
won by
range vote
each candidate


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FIG. 4
----CANDIDATES' IDEOLOGICAL SPREAD ----

A (100) (100)--------B ----- C

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FIG. 5
---- CANDIDATES' IDEOLOGICAL SPREAD AND VOTER DISTRIBUTION ----
A (100)- (100)--------B (120) C

SAMPLE: 320 voters whose votes cast would represent the overall average outcome for the F3o4Qs in both the plurality vote and range vote scenarios. Range vote values are scaled in relation to the size of the sample constituency for comparison to plurality shares.

Plurality Vote Yield

A: 170
B: 126
C: 24
Range Vote Yield

A: 190
B: 143
C: 101

Key :



(voter clusters)


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FIG. 6~ NATIONAL RANGE VOTE
POST ADJUSTMENT, PRE-PROCESS
ELECTOR SLATE

(C.A.S.S Summations's Leads in F3o4Qs,
Fourth Quadrant lower right)






Secondary Candidate in

F3o4Qs' Electoral Share




Lead Candidate in

F3o4Qs' Electoral Share



Bicam III proportioned shares of
State Representatives each state
won by range vote
for each candidate

Bicam III proportioned shares of
State Senators each state
won by range vote
for each candidate

Bicam III proportioned shares of
Presidential Districts each state
won by range vote
for each candidate


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Commonwealth Party
Translating the Range Vote into the Electoral College (Using Bicam III)
Last Revised 7/10/12