Range vote surveys which rate all the presidential candidates are completed by the candidates themselves, by their sample potential electors, the House, Senate and Supreme Court before 12 a.m. election day. After the national election results the bicameral electoral college values attained are combined, swapped and sorted to obtain a tally of each candidate's whole electors won plus any partial shares of any remaining scrap mixed-share electors. Candidates are then allowed the opportunity to participate in an exchange where they are able to combine or splice their partial shares of the scrap mixed-share electors freely with other candidates holding same in order to derive certain mutually constructed whole elector subsets consisting of the partial shares involved. Then the pertinent input from the range vote survey which is by and upon the candidates (or by their sample electors onto the candidates) who share in the same mutually constructed whole elector subset is applied relative to the combined and spliced partial shares of the candidate camps within. This grants a local victor who rates best within the whole elector subset at hand.

Award of the subset to a local victor follows the usual range vote function for politics where the one who accumulates the highest average rating by the range vote wins. Such a victor can award the subset's immediate elector slots at whim, perhaps in a manner agreed to with the other partial shareholders participating in the same mutual subset of whole elector(s). That is, that victor may award some of his electors to mutual holders constituting that subset, allowing them victory of some subset electors as well under any possible agreement. Actually, any candidate camp awarded electors whether as victors, donees or by procedural default can fill those slots in any valid manner they see fit. Also it may be best to make the results as a whole of either the candidates' or the sample electors' range vote surveys known to the various campaigns so they can anticipate the local victors in order to best construct & hammer out the agreements over any potential whole elector subsets.

Now if there happens to be a tie (or perhaps some ratings near enough within statistical error) concerning two or more leading candidates by that range vote survey then, assuming any state of surprise, the candidates involved in the tie are allowed the opportunity to mutually consider & administer any new agreement over awarding the constructed subset's whole electors in question to particular victor(s) and do so directly before having to resort instead to alternate methods of determination.

Concerning those leading range ties, whether there is award of any electors by default, what remaining electors are left to award & possibly when there is lack of agreement how further alternate methods come into play all depend on the tie procedure used. One procedure is to wholly award the constructed mixed-share elector subset at hand to just one of the tied candidates (officially & initially). The other is some form of dispersion where those tied elector subsets are able to be divvied by whole electors amongst the various tied candidates. In dispersion, the first dispersal is an equal base distribution among tied candidates when possible.

One would think that if a candidate camp with partial share in certain constructed mixed-share electors or subsets figures they can get a better deal in some other construction or the other shareholders of the initial construction renege on some agreement, then that candidate camp may pull out and help form another construction assuming there is enough time before some looming deadline to cast the electors in flesh and blood. Any such deadlines would be dependent upon the state legislatures and the Congress via Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

Before we get to describing any protocols, we repost the following text that preceded the link to this section on the original Bicameral Electoral College Reform page in order to make convenient the principles of the order of precedence used:

These stated principles will initiate a cycle starting with the range vote function applied upon the candidate camps' electoral results within the mutually constructed elector subsets, allowing for a local victor to possibly donate or employ electors about the other near presidential campaigns as enticement perhaps to build those certain mutual whole electors. There may be reconsideration of any prior agreements that were made in anticipation of one clear victor when leading tied candidates emerge who may then, if in agreement, allocate directly the electors in question on account of their exclusive lead status. However, if there is no mutual agreement over administering allocations by the leading range-tied candidates then the alternate method of determination comes into play which is the relative rank of the leading range-tied candidate camps' in the overall electoral results. Now should ties happen there as well then from amongst those specific overall-tied candidates they can again consider agreement concerning the elector allocations in question. If there is no agreement there, then determination moves to intervention of outside legislative then judicial bodies or finally by lot if all else fails.

As is stated later in this treatise, the protocols described for the more extreme cases with ties on top of ties and other rare occurrences may be overkill since ties in range votes are less likely and thus further ties are reduced in chance. Note that any such occurrences are further limited in measure with the maximum of mixed-share electors at N-1. Nonetheless, such descriptions are herein carried out on behalf of the case of very close elections accompanied by such concerns. Besides, such indepth discourse tests the rigors of this system and helped establish the structure of the more routine levels of protocol.

Our process to determine award of those scrap mixed-share electors as a function of the electorate's election results makes use of the range or score vote. A survey using that method previously taken by the presidential candidates will be utilized in which each candidate was to rate all the candidates. The survey is taken previous to election day in order to focus more on candidate quality considerations as opposed to the more immediate strategic impulses resulting from the election's electoral college allocations. After the election, only the input by each candidate who holds partial share in any particular constructed whole elector subset derived from the scrap mixed-share electors and the parts of their input which are applicable upon those same type of candidates involved will be used towards awarding that subset's elector(s). By each candidate's relative share of that subset their relevant input will be proportioned. All such input is now executed as a distinct range vote. The results of this truncated and adjusted application of the range (or score) vote will determine which victor candidate is the best rated or more acceptable amongst the mixed-share candidates involved to win those particular scrap mixed-share electors making up the constructed subset. For reference we will refer to this as 'ranging' or 'scoring the scrap'.

Another way to obtain a survey rating of all the candidates for ranging or scoring the scrap is by getting a representative sample of potential electors from each of the presidential candidate camps where they too take a similar survey prior to the election. Norms derived on behalf of each of those samples from the camps who hold partials of the scrap mixed-share electors constituting a subset at hand would likewise be proportioned by relative share and plugged into this truncated application of the range vote in lieu of the presidential candidates' input. There may be some differences between either version, but each should function within similar parameters in determining the final allocation victor for those particular scrap electors at hand. This is surmised since the potential electors are loyalists to their candidate and to their ideology and they are chosen as such, thus they likely think similarly about the field of candidates as their favored one does. Yet maybe substitution of the potential elector's for the candidate's survey input or vice versa can resolve leading range-tied situations by just enough of a margin if such substitution is considered valid.

As compared to just a list of names on a range vote survey to have scores pegged to them, a more qualitative range vote survey provides deeper analysis, This would bring forth a more honest or accurate assessment of the candidates by rating them in various aspects such as their economic and political beliefs, their stance on crime and the role of government, social and foreign policy and general attributes like honesty, character & temperament. Candidate's performance in the past along with their opinions on current issues plus their constitutional adherence should be included as well. All such scores in those categories could be focused together into one overall index value associated with a particular candidate. The campaigns would review and agree over the wording of the survey as to patrol against bias or manipulative word-smithing.

In the previous version of this process, we ranged all the scrap mixed-share electors at once as a single 'district' since to do otherwise elector-by-elector by a possible outside interest would yield arbitrary results depending on how the candidates' partial shares happened to be arranged amongst each of those scrap electors. However with more thought, the potential differences in allocation to subsets of the scrap mixed-share electors would not be considered as arbitrary if certain subsets are constructed by the mutual cooperation amongst the candidates' campaigns providing partial shares. That is the freedom of association of the partial shares of the candidates can mutually construct certain whole mixed-share elector(s) or 'districts' in which the parties involved feel the results will more closely express the intentions or strategies on behalf of the constituencies they represent. It would be premature to range all the scrap mixed-share electors at once to one victor without allowing for the feasible distribution on behalf of the political or ideological cliques within.

So we now have the justification for attaining more precise 'districts' made up of certain partial shares that amount to whole elector values. We then range these subsets of electors to grant localized victors. Perhaps any remaining unuseable scrap mixed-share elector(s) will end up being ranged to settle that more disparate and unmutual 'district', yet the overall allocation of the total scrap mixed-share electors by subsets will be more agreeable to the candidate camps involved.

With any non-tied leading candidates resulting from ranged, scrap mixed-share elector subsets, we still award that subset's electors to that one highest victor in usual fashion for how range votes are used in elections. This is opposed to awarding the involved electors in some relative fashion amongst top competitors as one would think is hinted by olympic or sports competitions which use the range vote while awarding gold, silver and bronze medals. Notice those three type medals are given by rank and not according to preposed proportions of the scores. Remember too that we are excluding leading range-tied situations here. Under all these conditions, there is just no way to relatively disperse electors across one contained range application without introducing inconsistencies or contradictions.

So we look to these ranged, scrap elector subsets with leading non-tied results as 'district' races for an office that can be held by only one leading candidate who receives the highest approval. This is not to say however that the winning camp may not employ electors from another or perhaps donate their winnings to another candidate. Such may be desirable for some cooperative benefit or serve as an incentive for cooperation in constructing whole elector subsets. The political cliques involved would likely allow such transactions when they expect nearly the same ultimate outcome towards a final electoral vote.

Now we have some options to consider. When the lead candidates are tied (or near to a tie within statistical margin) by the results of ranging a scrap mixed-share elector subset, do we still award the whole set of electors to one eventual victor determined by some alternate criteria or do we in such case allow dispersion of the subset's electors one-by-one across the roster of tied candidates in some fashion? That is do we allocate wholly or disperse in leading tied cases? In the spirit of now awarding to multiple subsets carved out of all the scrap mixed-share electors, we consider doing analogous on behalf of leading tied candidates from ranged subsets when those situations arise. We will allow this as long as it does not incorporate unethical practice or inconsistencies that would render allocations ambivalent or arbitrary throughout procedure and protocol either locally or in their ultimate effect. Further analysis in solidifying acceptance of dispersion amongst range-tied candidates may be needed, but as perceived at the time of this posting it so far appears to be a kosher option. You may wish to send alert of any concern to the contrary.

In usage it may work like this: When the number of leading range-tied candidates across a subset is equal to the number of its electors to allocate, we just give one to each by default and they can do with them as they wish. If the number of subset electors is more than leading range-tied candidates and the candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the extras after equal base distribution, another method will be needed to assign those extras which happens to also be used and described in the following scenario....For the case when the number of subset electors is fewer than leading range-tied candidates where they too reach no mutual agreement on awarding, we give one elector at a time starting with the range-tied candidate who has the highest total number of overall whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results. For any remaining elector to award in this subset, the next range-tied candidate who possesses the next highest number of whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results -- that candidate receives an elector. Then same for the next highest and so on going with that descending criteria. So we award an elector to successive range-tied candidates by their rank of overall possessed whole+partial electors granted by the immediate national election results until depletion of the subset's free electors.

Notice this alternate determination based on the number of whole+partial electors held by a particular candidate via the immediate national election results uses the favoring trend of the overall electorate to determine subsequent allocations for leading range-tied candidates in a subset that exhibits an effective draw of opinion about them. This alternate method follows our earlier stated order of precedence that says the inherent representation via the partial shares of the candidates involved is used first and then if necessary their overall trend in the rest of the electorate comes into play before resorting to outside bodies for determination. For reference, we will call this alternate method of determination something like 'trending the lead range ties' or just 'trending' for short.

Generally for the dispersion option, should we also reach a tie in the number of possessed whole+partial electors overall via the immediate national election results between any remaining lead range-tied candidates eligible to be given electors and there are not enough electors to dish out equally between them in single fashion; barring some mutual agreement we may resort to calling on the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or the drawing of lots to decide in that order of precedence which of those candidates get the subset's free elector allocations in a dispersive manner. This will be described later.

Keep in mind that while dispersion and wholly allocating yield different outcomes in the award of a subset's electors, they are not contradictory or arbitrary methods within themselves. Despite that their outcomes are indeed different from each other, we are able to choose one or the other as standard options since both methods are reflective of valid perceptions on how to award electors concerning tied candidates. Mutual agreements among subset partial share candidates and the leanings of political cliques may significantly lessen the difference in final outcomes of both methods.

Now how would we have allocated electors when the lead candidates by result of ranging a scrap mixed-share elector subset are tied exactly or within margin of error and we had geared the process to award wholly (all subset electors) to one eventual victor dependent upon the alternate criteria? That is what if we decided not to allow for dispersion amongst leading range-tied candidates for some reason? Well, regardless to whether the number of free electors in the subset is less than, equal to or greater than the number of leading range-tied candidates and whenever those tied candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the subset's electors, they are awarded wholly to one of the leading range-tied candidates who possesses the highest total number of overall whole+partial electors via the immediate national election results. If there was a tie amongst them also for the highest rank of overall whole+partial electors possessed and such trend-tied candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the subset's electors, then from amongst those trend-tied candidates we use the latter determinations which will be to let the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or the drawing of lots decide the subset allocation in that order of precedence.

Notice if there had been mutual agreement amongst the tied candidates in either the range-tied or the trend-tied scenarios as to who should receive the free electors, they are able to award the free electors at their mutual whim -- neither wholly awarding or dispersing is required as a final outcome even though one method is officially or initially primed. This holds whether wholly allocating or dispersion is the method applied for any relevant tie situations.

When the latter procedure of letting the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or the drawing of lots decide the particular subset's electors regarding another leading tie amongst some leading range-tied candidates from trending, we must take into account the differences between cases of wholly allocating electors to one victor and the dispersion option. We first here consider the case of wholly allocating to one victor. Barring agreement, if there are more than three such leading trend-tied candidates via rank of their overall whole+partial electors granted by the national election, a favored three candidates shall be determined by the range vote survey previously taken by the House or if there happened to be just three such leading trend-tied candidates, we have no need to determine favorites. From there in a manner similar to the application of Amendment XII the House will determine a victor to be awarded all the subset's electors and the Senate will do likewise in an analogous situation for the vice-presidential electoral contest, except they quorum from a favored two candidates if there are initially three or more who are such leading trend-tied. The least amount of leading trend-tied candidates that could be is two and in such cases the relevant bodies will immediately determine a winner by quorum as described in Amendment XII.

If there is any hang-up in getting down to the three or two required favored trend-tied candidates for the House or Senate respectively, the Supreme Court will determine any remaining numbered favorites from amongst the candidates in question by result of their previously taken range vote survey. For any unworkable ties or undetermination in the Court's range vote survey, they may take a straight vote over the candidates in question. (Does threshold plurality suffice in some cases?) Then the House (or Senate) will proceed with quorums using the Supreme Court's determined favorites from there. If the Supreme Court could not settle the favorites issue, the remaining candidates in question will draw lots to achieve the required favored status and the House (or Senate) will proceed upon them with quorums from there.

Now should the House (or Senate) final victor decision be undetermined, then the Supreme Court's previously taken range vote survey will grant all the subset's free electors to a victor from amongst the favored or required candidates with leading ties in the quorum or from amongst some or all of those in question of the favored/required candidates where necessary. Now should the Supreme Court's range vote survey outcome for victor also be tied or undetermined, then the Supreme Court may vote in straight fashion towards a victor from the candidates in question. If that too is a tie or undetermined, the relevant favored/required candidates up to that point shall repetitively draw lots in some fashion in order to determine who will get one of the subset's elector allocations until depletion of the free electors in the subset involved. (Resorts to a dispersion.)

Considering when dispersion is the inherent method utilized in range ties and thus so in cases of embedded trending-ties, we start by remembering to pick up where we left off earlier at the second to last paragraph of the subheading (B) By Dispersion For Leading Range-Ties :

...'Should we also reach a tie in the number of possessed whole+partial electors overall via the immediate national election results between any remaining lead range-tied candidates eligible to be given electors and there are not enough electors to dish out equally between them in single fashion; barring some mutual agreement we may resort to calling on the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or the drawing of lots to decide in that order of precedence which of those candidates get the subset's free elector allocations in a dispersive manner. This will be described later.'

Well, here we go:

So at any point where there are fewer free electors in that subset to give out amongst a string of trend-tied candidates who are embedded in an array of range-tied candidates, we need protocol to decide which of those trend-tied camps will get one of the remaining electors. Notice if we had an equal number of free electors left compared to the trend-tied string of candidates or enough to reach the next lower trending candidate who is not trend-tied with any one in the range-tie array, we would just give the electors one-by-one up to those limits. However, for these situations here we happen to always be short free electors to a string of trend-tied candidates.

Getting to our first case of protocol, if the string of trend-tied candidates remaining happens to be two with no agreement (thus you have one free elector remaining to give) then we invoke the quorum in Amendment XII to be taken by the House (or Senate for vice-presidential subsets) upon the string of two trend-tied candidates where the winner gets the free elector. If that doesn't work out, then the Supreme Court decides the winner by their range vote survey's results concerning the duce string of trend-tied candidates. If that falters then the court can opt to taking a straight vote in usual majority fashion. Assuming there is no determined court decision then we resort to drawing lots amongst the two candidate camps for that subset's final elector.

We consider now that for further numbers of trend-tied candidates in a string, say K where K > 2, the number of free electors left to give out amongst them ranges from 1 to K-1.

Now if the string of trend-tied candidates is three with no mutual agreement, we again wish to invoke the quorum by the House in Amendment XII which will determine the rank order for award of the subset's free electors one-by-one in dispersive manner. However if this string of trend-tied candidates is for a vice-presidential contest then we first use the Senate's previously taken range vote survey on all candidates but only pertaining to the results upon the three trend-tied candidate camps. This will determine the two favored candidates to either receive one each of the two free subset electors or in other cases barring agreement, to further have a quorum taken on them by the Senate to establish the rank order for award of the subset's one free elector. Should there be an unworkable tie or undetermination for the Senate's two favored candidates, the Supreme Court will determine such from the candidates in question by the results of their previously taken range vote survey or by a straight vote should that range vote not work out. If neither work then the candidates in question will draw lots to achieve the required favored status. Now if there is a quorum tie or undetermination by the House or Senate that is unworkable towards award of each of the subset's free electors then the Supreme Court will step in and award victor(s) from amongst the tied or involved candidates in question by result of its previously taken range vote survey or a straight vote should that range vote not work out. Should this not work either then the candidates in question will draw lots to determine a rank of award towards each free subset elector.

From the examples above and incorporating cases where there can be more trending-tied candidates on a string, we make some further rules:

When the string of trend-tied candidates for a presidential contest be four or more and the remaining electors to award in the subset happen to be at least three or when the string of trend-tied candidates for a vice-presidential contest be three or more and the remaining electors to award in the subset happen to be at least two, we resort to solely using the results of the range vote survey taken before the election by either the House or Senate respectively to award electors barring mutual agreement amongst the trend-tied candidates. The successive ranks inherent in that range or score vote survey for the candidates involved will be what determines the order of a grant of a free elector from the subset to a particular trend-tied candidate along the string. Ties in the House or Senate range vote survey can be tolerated as long as they do not extend beyond the subset's number of free electors left to be granted. Should that happen or should the congressional body's range vote survey be undetermined, the Supreme Court will settle that body's range vote survey tie amongst the candidates involved or complete the establishment of or completely establish a rank for the presidential or vice-presidential trend-tied candidates by its own range vote survey. Should the Supreme Court's own range vote survey or their straight vote decision not extinguish ties beyond exhaust of the subset's free electors or be undetermined, then the further or relevant candidates in question on the trend-tied string will draw lots to determine an order of rank for the exhaust of the subset's free electors towards any remaining trend-tied candidates.

When the string of trend-tied candidates for a presidential contest be four or more and the remaining electors to award in the subset happen to be less than three or when the string of trend-tied candidates for a vice-presidential contest be three or more and the remaining electors to award in the subset happen to be less than two (one), we still use the House or Senate's range vote surveys to establish the favored three or two trend-tied candidates respectively for Amendment XII fashion. From there the relevant congressional body performs a quorum upon them to establish a rank of grant of the subset's free electors. Should there be an unworkable tie or undetermination in the House or Senate's range vote surveys for the favored candidates, the Supreme Court will determine such from the candidates in question by the results of their previously taken range vote survey or by a straight vote should that range vote not work out. If neither work then the candidates in question will draw lots to achieve the required favored status. Now if there is a quorum tie or undetermination by the House or Senate that is unworkable towards award of each of the subset's free electors then the Supreme Court will step in and award victor(s) from amongst the tied or involved candidates in question by result of its previously taken range vote survey or a straight vote should that range vote not work out. Should this not work either then the candidates in question will draw lots to determine a rank of award towards each free subset elector.

Sometimes there may be greater advantage to a particular campaign in going for more disparate but determinable subsets with more chance of favorable electors granted than in cases where the mutual clique subsets happen to get into cumbersome ties which invoke need of outside bodies to award electors using different priorities. Then again, it could also be the other way around. Various opportunities should be considered. Also, recombining into larger or smaller subsets which may be more locally determinable could preserve some inherent representation through the partial shares of the candidates involved as opposed again to the latter methods of congressional and judicial bodies interceding. It all depends on many factors like the political camps and whether there is enough time left before some deadline.

Actually, this process may be overkill since range voting is said to rarely result in ties. So it could be that most if not all scrap mixed-share elector subsets may usually be determined by initial range vote survey. We also consider the maximum number of possible scrap mixed-share electors (N-1) and the propensity of the candidate camps to find mutual agreement within constructed subsets towards some determinable advantage. Will such qualities greatly limit the need of the more involved subset machinations? One would think off-hand that if there are range-tied subsets without agreement that trending will usually resolve them. Alternates or latter procedures may not need to be invoked often and if needed will determine a sure allocation under precedences considered. Nonetheless, we delve into the scrap mixed-share elector subset allocations to be prepared for any possible close election results but also to more fully explain the intent and justification that the functions of this process are based on.

It would be desirable to analyze these situations through a computer simulation of the whole bicameral electoral college especially for close or extreme elections in order to get a good idea of the behaviors of this process and its protocols. Speaking of computers, there should also be 'firms' on behalf of the candidate camps using electoral exchange programs that analyze and seek out the best mixed-share scrap electors to construct amongst the various political cliques in order to achieve the most desirable elector allocations possible. The situation may be in flux and experience various changes as one candidate camp steps in to pair partial elector shares with others. Perhaps programs using the tenets of matrix or linear algebra will come in handy for these applications. These exchanges may not be of great importance in some elections but more so in others.

Since the exchanges will deal with a noticeably smaller number of electors compared to the whole, one would imagine that the campaign camps involved delay their implementation beyond the point at which the larger number of whole electors begins to coalesce around some leading main candidates according to overall electorate shares and interests. Resolving the scrap mixed-share electors may be more of a concern with last-minute strategic considerations as opposed to just the quality of candidates. How close of an election determines the influential weight of the process. As mentioned before, any deadline for actually finalizing all electors to flesh and blood humans can influence emergence of some lead candidates and the final allocations of the mixed-share electors due to frequency of recombinations or fluidity's reaction to the relative urgency.

Should the scrap mixed-share elector allocations be delayed or undetermined because of some ballot issues or election disputes in certain places, it may be helpful to study the disputed votes in question and then considering the possible breadth of outcomes, plug them into this system to see if such discrepancies will have an appreciable effect on the final outcome for president. For instance, the possible maximum ballot shares for particular candidates in disputed precincts may be better ascertained than their actual vote counts. So those maximum values could be inserted into theoretically possible scrap mixed-share elector subsets and the range vote survey applied on them to gauge all situations. This exercise could possibly show that certain scrap mixed-share elector subsets would yield the same victor(s) for any intermediate values. Better still, despite who is a subset's local victor(s), the eventual outcome by their final electors towards a final candidate will not likely change from amongst those more politically cliqued mutual subsets.

Consider too where a ballot dispute can reft the final allocation of the scrap mixed-share electors due to uncertainty in the candidate exchange. Plus we would assess the weight of any magnitude of electors in dispute. Take into account as well undetermination from the dispute effecting the relative standing between two candidates in their overall rank of whole+partial electors which is to be tallied from the immediate national election. Imagine if this undetermination also effects the outcome of certain subsets due to the fact that those same two candidates are leading range-tied in them and awaiting a trending outcome to settle. Should the number of those leading range-tied electors or the generally disputed electors involved not be too great and depending on the candidates, simulating elector outcomes through a computer program using variance of a local court's decisions who has jurisdiction over the dispute may show that the end result carries little difference either way. This is because of the final coalescing about main candidates in the electoral college and the unified end strategy of the politically cliqued subsets.

It may also be the case that scrap mixed-share elector subsets negotiate new agreements concerning the award of mutual electors perhaps to mitigate the effects of the court decision or to exercise leverage in anticipation of same, both of which may or may not have appreciable effects. Then again, like in 2000, there may be cases where there is an appreciable change in the final outcome due to the number of electors in question which depend on the court's decision and that is why a paper trail ballot stub and other safety features are advocated on the original Bicameral Electoral College Reform page. Nevertheless, if local courts cannot resolve the contended ballots then it may be a desirable back-up to use the House, Senate, Supreme Court or random protocols within this process where or whenever applicable to reach a conclusion concerning any possible involved or dispute-created scrap mixed-share electors. The Congress and state legislatures may wish to officiate any of this where necessary by appropriate legislation.