Range vote surveys which rate all the presidential candidates are completed by the candidates themselves, by their sample potential electors, the House, Senate and Supreme Court before 12 a.m. election day. After the national election results the bicameral electoral college values attained are combined, swapped and sorted to obtain a tally of each candidate's whole electors won plus any partial shares of any remaining scrap mixed-share electors. Candidates are then allowed the opportunity to participate in an exchange where they are able to combine or splice their partial shares of the scrap mixed-share electors freely with other candidates holding same in order to derive certain mutually constructed whole elector subsets consisting of the partial shares involved. Then the pertinent input from the range vote survey which is by and upon the candidates (or by their sample electors onto the candidates) who share in the same mutually constructed whole elector subset is applied relative to the combination of spliced and/or partial shares of the candidate camps within. This grants a local victor who rates best within the whole elector subset at hand.

Award of the subset to a local victor follows the usual range vote function for politics where the one who accumulates the highest rating by the range vote wins. Such a victor can award the subset's immediate elector slots at whim, perhaps in a manner agreed to with the other partial/spliced shareholders participating in the same mutual subset of whole elector(s). That is, that victor may award some of his electors to mutual holders constituting that subset, allowing them victory of some subset electors as well under any possible agreement. Actually, any candidate camp awarded electors whether as victors, donees or by procedural default can fill those slots in any valid manner they see fit. Also it may be best to make the results as a whole of either the candidates' or the sample electors' range vote surveys known to the various campaigns in order to best construct & hammer out the agreements over any potential whole elector subsets through anticipation of the local victors.

Now if there happens to be a tie (or perhaps some results near enough within statistical error) concerning two or more leading subset candidates by internal application of that range vote survey then - assuming any state of surprise - the candidates involved in the tie are allowed the opportunity to mutually consider & administer any new agreement over awarding the constructed subset's whole electors in question to particular victor(s) and do so directly before having to resort instead to any necessary alternate methods of determination.

Concerning those leading range ties via a subset - whether there is award of any electors by default, what remaining electors are left to award & possibly when there is lack of agreement then how any further alternate methods come into play all depend on whether the resolution used distributes free electors as a whole or disperses them. Whole distribution eventually awards the constructed mixed-share elector subset at hand to just one of the tied candidates (officially & initially before any possible donations). The other way is some form of dispersion where those tied elector subsets are geared to be divvied by whole electors amongst all or some of the tied candidates. In dispersion, the first dispersal is an equal base distribution among tied candidates when possible.

One would think that if a candidate camp with partial/spliced share in any certain constructed mixed-share electors or subsets figures they can get a better deal in some other construction or the other shareholders of any initial construction renege on some agreement, then that candidate camp may pull out and help form another construction assuming there is enough time before some looming deadline of casting the electors in flesh and blood. Any such deadlines would be dependent upon the state legislatures and the Congress via Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

Before we get to describing any protocols, we repost the following text that preceded the link to this section on the original Bicameral Electoral College Reform page in order to make convenient the principles of the order of precedence to be used:

These stated principles will initiate the cycle starting with the proportioned range vote survey input concerning the occupants of a subset as aforementioned in the first paragraph. Assuming a resulting sole lead candidate, such a local victor is permitted to donate electors about the other presidential campaigns in the subset as enticement perhaps to have built such a certain, mutual whole elector collection. There may be reconsideration of any prior construct agreements that were made in anticipation of one clear victor should any subset change bring forth leading tied candidates who may then, if in agreement, allocate directly the free subset electors in question on account of their exclusive lead status. However, if there is no mutual agreement over administering allocations by those leading range-tied candidates then an alternate method of determination comes into play which is the relative rank of those leading range-tied candidate camps in the overall electoral results. Now should ties happen there as well then from such specific overall-tied candidates they can consider agreement concerning the elector allocations in question. If there is no mutual agreement there, then determination depends on the appropriate congressional body's range vote survey rankings pertaining to the overall-tied candidates. If ties or undeterminations happen there, then resort to the range vote survey or a straight vote by the Supreme Court to eliminate any specific remaining ties or undeterminations in question. Finally we go just by lot if any Supreme Court results tie or fail concerning any further remaining occurrences.

As is stated later in this treatise, the protocols described for the more extreme cases with ties on top of ties and other rare occurrences may be overkill since ties in range votes are not likely which limits the chance of further ties by the same scope. Nonetheless, such descriptions are herein carried out on behalf of the case of very close elections accompanied by such concerns. Besides, such indepth discourse tests the rigors of this system and ensures determination of the electoral college.

Our process to determine award of those scrap mixed-share electors as a function of the electorate's election results makes use of the range or score vote. A survey using that method previously taken by the presidential candidates will be utilized in which each candidate was to rate all the candidates. The survey is taken previous to election day in order to focus more on candidate quality considerations as opposed to the more immediate strategic impulses resulting from the election's electoral college allocations. Sometime after the election - probably as overall lead candidates become set and subsets of the mixed-share electors are constructed - only the input by each candidate who holds partial/spliced share in any particular constructed whole elector subset and only the parts of their input which are applicable upon those same type of candidates involved will be used towards awarding that subset's elector(s). By each candidate's relative share of that subset their relevant input will be proportioned. All such input is now executed as a distinct range vote. The results of this truncated and adjusted application of the original range (or score) vote survey will (barring ties) determine which victor candidate is the best rated or more acceptable amongst the mixed-share candidates involved to win those particular scrap mixed-share electors making up the constructed subset. For reference we will refer to this as 'ranging' or 'scoring the scrap'.

Another way to obtain a survey rating of all the candidates for ranging or scoring the scrap is by getting a representative sample of potential electors from each of the presidential candidate camps where they too take a similar survey prior to the election. Norms derived on behalf of each of those samples from the camps who hold partials (or splices) of the scrap mixed-share electors constituting a subset at hand would likewise be proportioned by relative share and plugged into a similarly truncated application of the range vote survey in lieu of the presidential candidates' input as referenced above. There may be some differences between either version, but each should function within similar parameters in determining the final allocation victor for those particular scrap electors at hand. This is surmised since the potential electors are loyalists to their candidate and to their ideology and they are chosen as such, thus they likely think similarly about the field of candidates as their favored one does. Yet maybe substitution of the potential elector's for the candidate's survey input or vice versa can resolve leading range-tied situations by just enough of a margin if such substitution is considered valid. Averaged combination of the same may work as well.

As compared to just a list of names on a range vote survey to have scores pegged to them, a more qualitative range vote survey provides deeper analysis. This would bring forth a more honest or accurate assessment of the candidates by rating them in various aspects such as their economic and political beliefs, their stance on crime and the role of government, social and foreign policy and general attributes like honesty, character & temperament. A candidate's performance in the past along with their stances on current issues plus their constitutional adherence should be included as well. All such scores in those categories could be focused together into one overall index value associated with a particular candidate. The campaigns would review and agree over the wording of the survey as to patrol against bias or manipulative word-smithing.

In the previous version of this process, we ranged all the scrap mixed-share electors at once as a single "district" since to do so otherwise elector-by-elector as constructed by exterior interest would yield arbitrary results dependent upon how the involved candidates' partial/spliced shares happened to be arranged amongst each of those scrap electors. However with more thought, the potential differences in allocation to subsets of the scrap mixed-share electors would not be considered as arbitrary if certain subsets are constructed by the mutual cooperation amongst the candidates' campaigns providing partial or spliced shares. That is the freedom of association of the candidates and of the political capital entrusted to them - their partial and spliced shares - will allow for certain mutually constructed, whole mixed-share elector subsets or "districts" in which the parties involved feel the results will more closely express the intentions or strategies on behalf of the constituencies they represent. It would be premature to range all the scrap mixed-share electors at once to one victor without allowing for the feasible distribution on behalf of the political or ideological cliques within.

So we now have the justification for attaining more precise "districts" made up of certain partial/spliced shares that amount to whole elector values. We then range these subsets of electors to grant localized victors. Perhaps any remaining unuseable scrap mixed-share elector(s) will end up being ranged to settle that more disparate and unmutual "district", yet the overall allocation of the total scrap mixed-share electors by subsets will be more agreeable to more of the candidate camps involved.

With any non-tied leading candidates resulting from ranged, scrap mixed-share elector subsets, we still award that subset's electors to that one highest victor in usual fashion for how range votes are used in elections. This is opposed to awarding the involved electors in some rank fashion amongst top competitors as one would think is hinted by Olympic or sports competitions which use the range vote while awarding gold, silver and bronze medals. Notice those three type medals are given by rank and not according to proportions of the scores. Remember that we are excluding leading range-tied situations here. And under all these conditions, there is just no way to relatively disperse electors across one contained range application without introducing inconsistencies or contradictions.

So we look to these ranged, scrap elector subsets with leading non-tied results as "district" races towards a sole victor which determines the subset's elector allocations. This is not to say however that the winning camp may not employ electors from another campaign still to attain a loyal vote or perhaps donate their winnings to another candidate. Such may be desirable for some benefit whether real or symbolic or serve as an incentive for cooperation in constructing particular whole elector subsets. The political cliques involved would likely allow such transactions when they expect similar if not the same ultimate suffrage of their subset towards a final electoral vote for president.

Now we have some options to consider. When the lead candidates are tied (or near to a tie within statistical margin) by the results of ranging a scrap mixed-share elector subset, do we still award the whole set of electors to one eventual victor determined by some alternate criteria or do we in such case allow dispersion of the subset's electors one-by-one across the roster of tied candidates in some fashion? That is do we allocate wholly or disperse in leading tied cases? In the spirit of now awarding to multiple subsets carved out of all the scrap mixed-share electors, we consider doing analogous on behalf of leading tied candidates from ranged subsets when those situations arise. We will allow this as long as it does not incorporate unethical practice or inconsistencies that would render allocations ambivalent or arbitrary throughout procedure and protocol either locally or in their ultimate effect. Further analysis in solidifying acceptance of dispersion amongst range-tied candidates may be needed, but as perceived at the time of this posting it so far appears to be a kosher option. You may wish to send alert of any concern to the contrary.

In usage it may work like this: When the number of leading range-tied candidates across a subset is equal to the number of its electors to allocate, we just give one to each by default and they can do with them as they wish. If the number of subset electors is more than leading range-tied candidates and the candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the extras after equal base distribution, another method will be needed to assign those extras which happens to also be used and described in the following scenario....For the case when the number of subset electors is fewer than leading range-tied candidates where they too reach no mutual agreement on awarding, we give one elector at a time starting with the range-tied candidate who has the highest total number of overall whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results. For the following or any remaining elector to award in this subset, the next range-tied candidate who possesses the next highest number of whole plus partial elector values won via the immediate national election results -- that candidate receives an elector. Then same for the next highest and so on going with that descending criteria. So we award an elector to successive range-tied candidates by their rank of overall possessed whole+partial electors granted by the immediate national election results until depletion of the subset's free electors.

Notice this alternate determination based on the total number of whole+partial electors held by a particular candidate via the immediate national election results uses the favoring trend of the overall electorate to determine free elector allocations for leading range-tied candidates in a subset that exhibits an effective draw of opinion about them. This alternate method follows our earlier stated order of precedence that says the inherent representation via the partial/spliced shares of the candidates involved is used first and then if necessary their overall trend in the rest of the electorate comes into play before resorting to outside bodies for determination. For reference, we will call this alternate method of determination something like 'trending the lead range ties' or just 'trending' for short.

Generally for the dispersion option, should we also reach a tie in the total overall number of possessed whole+partial electors via the immediate national election results between any remaining lead range-tied candidates eligible to be given electors and there are not enough electors to dish out equally between them in single fashion, then barring some mutual agreement we may resort to calling on the range vote survey rankings of the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or the drawing of lots to decide in that order of precedence which of those candidates get the subset's remaining free elector allocations in a dispersive manner. This will be described later.

Keep in mind that while dispersion and wholly allocating yield different outcomes in the award of a subset's electors, they are not contradictory or arbitrary methods within themselves. Despite that their outcomes are indeed different from each other, we are able to choose one or the other as a standard option since both methods are reflective of valid perceptions on how to award electors concerning tied candidates. Mutual agreements among the subset's spliced & partial-share candidates and the leanings of political cliques constructing the subset plus the emerging sway of the overall major candidates will significantly lessen the difference in final outcomes of both methods.

Still, if there is concern that in a close race down to the wire that the people will object to the final outcome because dispersion was chosen over wholly allocating or vice versa (the losers will tend to oppose the method chose) then let the people decide for themselves which method is to be utilized beforehand. Do so by putting it to a choice on the ballot in each presidential election where one method is invoked over the other based on a popular vote outcome. That way the end result will always be the people's own "fault". A simple description of the two methods concerning how each functions to determine a winner in a real close contest would be posted in various media before the election and in precincts on election day.

Now how would we have allocated electors in the case of lead candidates by result of ranging a scrap mixed-share elector subset (tied exactly or within margin of error) and we had geared the process to award wholly (all subset electors) to one eventual victor dependent upon the alternate criteria? That is what if we decided not to allow for dispersion amongst leading range-tied candidates for some reason? Well, regardless to whether the number of free electors in the subset is less than, equal to or greater than the number of leading range-tied candidates and whenever those tied candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the subset's electors, they are awarded wholly to one of the leading range-tied candidates who possesses the highest total number of overall whole+partial electors via the immediate national election results. If there was a tie amongst them also for the highest rank of overall whole+partial electors possessed and such trend-tied candidate camps cannot agree who should receive the subset's electors, then from amongst those trend-tied candidates we use the latter determinations which will be to let the range vote survey rankings by the House (or Senate), Supreme Court or just the drawing of lots decide the subset allocation in that order of precedence.

Notice if there had been mutual agreement amongst the tied candidates in either the range-tied or the trend-tied scenarios as to who should receive the free electors, they are able to award the free electors at their mutual whim -- neither wholly awarding or dispersing is required as a final outcome even though one method is officially or initially primed. This holds whether wholly allocating or dispersion is the method applied for any relevant tie situations.