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BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM
Revitalizing Presidential Selection
Quick state-by-state allocation comparison tables start past the middle of this page.
Latest Revisions are under the Hyperlinked Page Index.
Hyperlinked Page Index
LATEST REVISIONS: 7/5/10
If you have downloaded this beforehand, you may wish
to upgrade your copy to the newest version.
If you find need of change in text or to the methods within, your request or any questions can be e-mailed to us. You may still want to check back every once in a while in case there is news regarding the
electoral college topics within.
[Newer or revised text within may appear green including the text via these links.]
Subheadings added to page text.
New links in the LINKS Section.
The refined process to determine the assignment of the scrap mixed-share electors has now been posted. [Link amongst the olive green text as 'SECTION'.]
In states like Connecticut and Rhode Island with no functioning county governments, a caucus of aldermen may choose state senators.
For population segments outside of place or town designations, selected residents and/or perhaps selected local officials such as law enforcement or emergency service personnel in jurisdiction may be chosen to attend the caucus. (No incorporated text to link to.)
Another check to compensate popular voters against glaring wayward appointments from party
state reps or county commissioner candidates or when all such candidates
wish to appoint same (type) of presidential candidates or state senators. {Linked: COMPENSATIONS }
State legislators campaign their presidential preferences. Their finalized votes posted before polls open on election day.
What to do when a district's result does not yield a majority candidate. ( 1st green sentence in that paragraph.)
Text added to Bicam III on option to weigh rural or urban districts more in relatively extreme states.
Blurb added about averaging the popular and district methods concerning a state's whole popular vote.( Last green sentence in Bicam I section.)
Split ticket for presidential and vice-presidential races to achieve parity with electoral college protocol.
Summary section for Bicameral Electoral College Plan added.
Opting some electors to be previous residents of other states. ( 'And while still retaining...' )
(Older Revisions)
New terminology: 'mixed elector' better differentiates from 'fractional elector' and 'partial elector'. (Bicam II)
Section addressing contested elections added. (Bicam II)
Appointment of State Senators -- Updated on States w/ Senate Districts (Bicam II)
BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III
State popular vote allocations (Bicam II) [In green.]
Average of Bicam II applied to current electors.
Presidential Debate Forums
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SUMMARY
Depending on the population of your state, your state my gain or lose
electors in Bicameral Electoral College Plans II and III. However, Bicameral Electoral College I
keeps the same elector allocations in terms of number that we have now. All the plans introduce some type of proportional representation amongst the candidates within each state's elector slate. The total national electors are split with one half indicating
the popular vote and the other half according to the vote of the state legislatures. Bicam II and III introduce
congressional weightings to each state's slate of electors via interstate sharing. This will result in partial and fractional elector
allocations, but they will be combined and swapped amongst the states to restore whole electors. The Constitution's original elector allocations will reflect the result of all this
through each state assigning its current electors in such a manner that the congressional-weighted proportions of the Bicameral Electoral College effectively determine a winner.
Here is a list form of the attributes of the Bicameral Electoral College Plans:
* Each state's share of electors is akin to their relative share of power in the
Congress -- an electoral college 'house' and 'senate' (versions II & III). States
cooperatively use current elector allocations to achieve this. No amending of the
Constitution required.
* Legislatures will directly determine half of the total national electoral allocation.
* Electors on behalf of each state will reflect the candidates' share of various popular and
legislative vote allocations dependent on the version implemented.
* Fractional, partial and mixed electors are combined/swapped amongst the states to
eventually arrive at a national result with all electors allocated as wholes to particular candidates after a determination process on behalf of the final scrap mixed-share electors.
* Presidential debates in various state legislatures will introduce state issues to
presidential selection.
* Senatorial appointments and gubernatorial electoral colleges are recommended.
It is now important that the state legislatures consider these compensational
maneuvers in the selection of presidential electors to facilitate better
governance from the victor. Consider how the third-party candidates will
effect the outcome of the race in the current system and in alternative
systems like the Bicameral Electoral College proposal. Which is more
beneficiary overall, more equitable, more fair to the various voters and
states?
Please take the time to study the plan and its nuances. You will need
to know the points to argue for it on your debate floors. For reference,
there are state-by-state tables of the plan starting after the middle of
this web page.
Thanks for your time.
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BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE I
Intro
First some background: The legislative branch is composed of two
houses -- the House of Representatives which allocates representation
to each state dependent upon population and the Senate which allows each
state to have an equal number of senators, namely two. All legislation must
pass approval by both houses and must be signed by the president to become
effective law. The president can veto legislation denying its passage, but his veto
can be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the Congress via both houses. Such is part of the system
of 'checks and balances' that keeps our government self-regulating against
undue powers and tyranny or at least impeding them (in theory at least).
Having a Senate and a House of Representatives as described above was
a compromise which kept small states from being totally drowned-out when voting
on national laws while still retaining the just advantage of more populous states
which is their greater net representation in the national congress. This bicameral compromise
addresses both concerns and splits Congress half-and-half.
Each house has a say on
national legislation and each effectively has half of the power of Congress when it comes
to the passage of laws -- one house votes with states as equals and the other
house with states allotted votes according to relative populations.
Checks, Balances, Legislatures
Now if you oppose the electoral college, then you are also opposing
a seedling of the nifty House and Senate compromise. Plus you are opposing the college's intermediary checks and balances and the opportunity
for us to get the states to more closely match the mathematical function of the House and Senate
when choosing a president. This is because the electoral
college allocates to each state a number of electors for choosing the president which is equal to
the number of senators and representatives that state has by both houses. So,
if we constantly use that type of allocated representation for the passage of our
national laws, why would we not employ similar mathematical principle in choosing a national
leader?
The Constitution grants every state legislature the sole power to determine
how those allocated electors are selected on behalf of their state to the electoral college. State legislatures
used to appoint US senators and they ratify amendments to our constitution. So legislatures
have intended function at the federal level. Until 1824, over a quarter
of state legislatures were choosing presidential electors. Our earliest presidential races
had substantially higher proportions than that choosing electors as opposed to total popular election
of electoral college electors as we have today. Now you see that state legislatures choosing presidents directly is not
out of the question.
As the archival presidential elections show, the founders
desired not just checks and balances between government branches, but they also
wanted checks and balances between government and the people as well -- functioning in both
directions. This is because the founders knew the people could be swayed by radicals
and mass movements possibly of tyrants or anti-Christ figures. An electoral college
would possibly serve as an obstacle or delay to the acquiring of the presidency
by such individuals since electors are not subject to office privileges or re-election nor
are they the people voting directly. They can opt to act on their own accord thus serving as
an intermediary check on presidential prospects. Electors too are subject to check and balance
as they can pay penalties for not providing their promised vote. So when someone is about to essentially
become a third of our national government, shouldn't the above elaborate
system of checks be utilized on their acquisition of power? Shouldn't that choice be subdivided
by states and by state populations just like our national government structure?
The privilege granted to you to vote for electoral college electors
is an accommodation of your state legislature who feels you can be trusted at
this time and thinks the masses are of stable enough mind, within sound reason
and perceives the society as
functionable and at relative peace. However, with today's goings on you have to begin to wonder
if this is still a valid perspective or if ever allowing for a sole popular vote determination
should ever have been dabbled with.
As stated above the checks and balances can work in reverse direction as
well. Say if a group of electors were chosen by a state legislature and that
group votes against a candidate where the people feel all this was done in an
air of frivolity or without due regard, the people will focus their punishment on the state legislature
in the following (or concurrent) election. Ideally, legislators with scruples would
more likely only take such risk of retaliation if they felt that the people's interests were
bent or the Republic faced trouble with a prospective national leader.
Powers of Representation
Before trying to do away with our important electoral college check,
consider Canada. They determine their prime minister through the majority or by the plurality
of seats won by a particular party in the representative house. While they do have a senate, the representative
body is usually where the prime minister is derived from. Since this house
is based on population, the national leader and the executive direction can solely be
determined by the more populated eastern provinces while the western provinces garner
substantially less influence. Thus, their national leaders are more skewed towards
the views and concerns of the big east provinces. This is one reason there
are growing secession sentiments and movements in western Canada. Without more electoral college balance, America may suffer in a
similar fashion with New York, California, Texas, Florida and several other big states solely
determining the outcome for president. It would be worse than it is now without an electoral college to give some boost
to the smaller states. Actually, the current electoral college form usually does agree with the popular vote most
of the time except for a few occasions. So why should popular vote purists bother to get rid of it altogether? The
few times it has diverted from the popular vote it was probably a needed check to do so.
If you wish to complain about the electoral college, you should do so by focusing
on the method your state legislature allows for elector selection. Mathematically, most states
employ the all-or-nothing mode whereby all electors to the electoral college
for a state are unanimously determined by winner of the state's popular vote. There are
some advantages to having all-or-nothing in the current system. It will make candidates for president
cater more strongly to the interests of your state or its majority in order to get all your state's
electoral points. If your state
is a smaller state it keeps you more competitive with the larger ones within that system. However,
what if an opposing candidate wins? If they only have support of the minority
in your state, they will have less incentive to accommodate your state in governing.
If it is not as close a race in your state, will they opt to campaign in other
states with closer races instead of vying for your state? Will candidates see your state
as one big blob and carry a watered-down, disingenuous, common denominator stance towards you or
would it be better if they could appeal more to the various regional issues in your state?
You may wish to consider the pros and cons as there are many possible outcomes.
Technically, perhaps the current all-or-nothing system may have been thought of as a safety
back in the day when travel was harsh, there were no instantaneous mass communications
and there were no computers. Today, however, all of these amenities exist. Campaigns can travel
anywhere quickly and the issues are more exposed to the masses. Ballots can be counted
quicker and easier. So there is less cause to unanimously round up elector counts each state. Thus the more
regional interests could shape races and hold their sway in close or not-so-close elections. If we were awarding a state's allocated electors by
some kind of proportional showings, candidates
would take interest in your state whether or not their polling was sufficiently beyond 50% as in today's system.
Considering relative representation amongst the states, the smaller
states are boosted via electors in the electoral college but there is a stronger leaning towards population share in comparison to
the Congress. For advancement, one plan we would consider is adhering the electoral college selection more closely to
the proportions and original principle of the Senate and House compromise.
So, during normal peaceful times with the masses of sound mind, we would
encourage each state to select its allotted electors by allowing half to be determined
by the state legislature. The other half would be chosen such that the proportion nearly reflects
the popular vote of the state either by congressional (or smaller) districts or just the popular statewide vote. The former
by district is more of a demographic method that reflects political distribution and densities,
trends or infrastructure. It may indicate how a state politically operates at a closer level -- the majority momentum of communities on the ground.
Popular Vote By Districts or Statewide Proportions?
The district method provides an incentive
for candidates to address majority concerns parsed through non-sovereign entities of equal populations within a state
which can reflect the weight of regional issues. From a national vantage point, it is noticeably different from having vast sovereign states of various
sizes acting as unanimous blobs to their common-denominator. An intrastate district method is consistent with how the U.S. House Representatives are selected. However,
in some cases the district method could conceivably vary greatly in outcome from the popular statewide vote and go more towards unanimity due to effectively binary races with intra-district results that favor one candidate against any of the others across almost all districts.
Thus, the latter method of employing the statewide popular vote result to the second
half of electors presents an option. One may prefer this option as a check or counter balance to the
district method that is used for the actual U.S. House selection. It also acts as a counter to the concerns of gerrymandering.
While it recognizes the contribution of every single ballot, a popular vote could be more prone to any concerns over statewide populism. Because of that, one may still prefer use of the district method which again provides for a consistency with
the congressional selection scheme. Note that when the results of a race in a particular district do not yield a (threshold) majority or a threshold plurality victor, that district's tally will simply resort to the popular vote proportions for the candidates in that
district. Generally, it depends on numerous circumstances whether the
popular or district method better reflects the political interests of a state. For a compromise, average both together. Regardless of which option chosen, another version of the plan is
to allow a third of the allotted electors to be selected by the state supreme court. Should some electors be chosen by
a governor? It is interesting in itself to debate the possibilities.
Overview and Our Demand
The advantages to this plan are substantial for consideration. The nation would
less likely be held hostage to just a few swing states during close elections. The several states
would be more empowered because electors from each state are also allocated by state legislatures which brings state concerns and issues to the table. The legislatures' choice
and the partitioned popular vote by each state can put more
emphasis on regional topics. Also the smaller several states have a greater number (and perhaps proportion) of state governments for candidates to
contend with and to be discerned by as opposed to just dealing with the fewer larger states' block vote. State legislators gain with their races garnering more attention since
they will have an effect on presidential outcomes which means voters have even more incentive to turn out for state level elections.
Overall, voters are more adequately represented using the conjunction of an intrastate popular or district vote along with the voter-determined state legislatures choosing electors. This is opposed to the current all-or-nothing popular
vote across a state currently in use which gives no electoral voice to the minority.
There is a caveat to our plan. Originally, the U.S. Senate was intended
to be comprised of senators who were chosen by state governments so that state governments
would have representation and a check with the federal level. That would include a check and balance with the direct
representatives of the people elected to the House. Today, we have no such thing since we elect senators
by popular vote. Despite the Senate having some unique impeachment and other functions, it's popular make-up basically results in a
functional two-house redundancy check-and-balance wise.
Also, wouldn't senate appointments by a state insulate against large statewide, big-money campaigns that many complain about?
With the case being that the general populace has total monopoly
in voting for the legislative and executive branches and perhaps until we re-establish state appointment of U.S. senators -- then the electoral college
should be determined totally by state legislatures. State legislatures need some amount of
voice and power returned to them at the federal level. Once senatorial appointment is
resumed, then our aforementioned plan of combining popular vote with legislature-determined electoral college
electors half-and-half by state would be initiated. (During the period of state legislatures totality, you will still have voice towards presidential selection
because you determine the make-up of your state legislature. As noted above, popular vote determines
2/3 of national government, the states 0/3. By this caveat, that would rebalance
it 1/3::1/3)
At any rate, we support the preservation of the electoral college while
considering revamping it at state level to more closely resemble the congressional House and Senate
compromise taking into account their effective bicameral proportions.
TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THIS: We consider the current times to be thwarted, skewed
and have long been unfairly biased in favor of the Republican and Democrat candidates
for decades through government campaign funding and manipulated ballot access.
Thus to make up for all the years of untrue elections, we believe it fair and proper that
for the next presidential election all of you pressure your state legislatures to allow only the selection
of third-party and independent electors for president (or at least vice president) in the electoral college.
This is on account of the long past and current electoral grievances. This would be a proper, compensatory
check and balance.
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Justification for an Alternative Pact
A sizeable number of state legislatures are considering a pact where
the several states will choose presidential electors in such a manner that
the electoral college merely reflects a national
popular vote winner unanimously, thereby nullifying the electoral college's numerical properties.
The arguments for this are that swing states of the current system beckon too
much influence and that the current all-or-nothing allocation of electors by each state
does not reflect a particular state's voter proportions. They also argue that
the smaller states are still too overshadowed by the larger states. We agree
with the first two current system disadvantages and thus have instituted our
own electoral college proposal above. We also concur with the third concern
of smaller state representations by the current nominal allocations of electors.
However, one reason why the electoral
college exists to begin with is to compensate for the smaller state representations.
It boosts the proportional share of
votes for the smaller states by allocating two extra electors for every state
(by Senate representation) along with the population-based elector allocations
(by number of House representatives). Resorting to a national popular vote
will in fact erase that extra boost for the smaller states. Obviously, a
popular vote will cater more to the larger states proportion-wise since they have larger
populations and thus more votes weighted in a popular election.
Note too that America's foundational checks and balances distribute power not only
amongst three branches of government, but also amongst a hierarchy of national,
state, local governments and the people. Our national laws are voted in through a house
of popular representation and concurrently through a chamber where the states sit as equals --
both arrangements splitting the national legislative power equally. Having the
senatorial side selected by the state governments was an ideal notion of state governments
keeping check on the people and on the higher-leveled national government.
Therefore, if there is going to be a pact amongst the states as far
as how they will choose their electors then let's have them allocate their CURRENT electors state
by state in such a manner that half of the RESULTING total electors will represent
the state legislatures' choices for president on an equal basis (just as it should happen for bills in the Senate).
The other half of the total electors will simply reflect the popular vote of each state with ratios matching the House
representative allocations. State popular tallies will either be determined by congressional (or smaller) districts or by statewide popular vote result.
Thus, we would then effectively have a Senatorial electoral college and a House or at-large House (or combo thereof) electoral college
with both colleges equally splitting the powers of choice between them which would be like or similar to the legislative branch structure.
Our original electoral college proposal (Bicameral I) is similar to this except that the comparative powers
amongst the states weigh more towards relative population while still
retaining electoral boosts for the smaller states. A national popular
vote however, would simply negate those electoral boosts and provides no venue for state governments.
Thus the national popular vote scheme also negates any way for an effective Senatorial
electoral college even if it was to be popularly executed as we do our national senate today.
Electors Via State Legislators and County Commissioners
In our proposed electoral
systems, the state government selection of electors for a president will be between you
and your state legislature. In other words, you vote for president
in more than one way. Your vote for the state legislature offices is also a
vote towards a presidential selection. Thus how you govern your state will also influence the
direction of the national executive branch. Once state senatorial appointment is achieved, this principle
will also emanate from your county seat.
To accommodate an informed choice towards
state legislators and instilling a check on them for their presidential stances during the campaign, the presidential leanings
of all state legislators and candidates (or potential appointees) for the same should be made known during the relevant campaign period. Their
stances should be officially finalized and posted at all polling places before the general public takes to the polls. A
finalization deadline (their official presidential vote expressing their choice for legislative electors) could perhaps take place by something like 1:00am on election
day. Similar deadline and posting takes place for county commissioners & candidates for same on their finalized choices for state senators by 2:00am.
For a further
check on wayward appointments or as compensation for voters ever being "boxed-in" under
unanimity of all state representative candidates' presidential choices or the analogous
concerning all county commissioner candidates' choices for state senators, visit this
link: COMPENSATIONS......
Smaller States as Leverage to Larger States
Now considering the boosting of the smaller states in the
electoral college, this can preserve some leverage to the large states too. Hence forward they will not have to
solely rely on countering their other big rivals themselves while smaller states would have been of little help on the
few-elector sidelines. A large state
can now convince smaller, more influenced states and their equal representations in the
electoral college senate to help counter a more populous rival state in the electoral college house.
So don't have a cow California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania & Florida! Seek influence on the
near or border states that you have commerce with or those that simply may share
a common concern. Those campaign dollars may obtain more electors towards your goals in the smaller states
because of the higher proportion of electors to their populations. Still, the bigger states will have noticeable influence just like they do
in the Congress with its similar proportions.
Obtaining the Most Representative Digital Electors to the Analog Election Results
And further, in an attempt to eliminate
aggregate round-off error amongst the states' tally and to more accurately
represent the results of the election -- all fractional, partial and mixed
elector allocation results of the states ( & D.C.) will be combined,
swapped and sorted until just any possible scrap mixed-share electors
remain. Then a process comes into play that determines the allocation of those final scrap mixed-share
electors. It first utilizes the inherent representation via the partial shares of the candidates
involved and then if necessary it relies on those same
candidates' overall trend exhibited in the rest of the electorate.
Both should take precedence before having to resort to any outside bodies
like the Congress, Supreme Court or random allocations -- all of which can be
invoked successively in case of ties or perhaps other undeterminable circumstances.
The process should weed-out approaches that can yield arbitrary results
or inconsistencies. It should carry out as best as possible political
representation and competition within those scrap mixed-share electors towards a localized victor using procedural
rationale and ethical considerations, all of which will determine the mathematical
model of its structure. We use this list of considerations as a reference in order to devise the
various protocols and alternates reflecting those priorities.
Note: For the number of candidates with electoral college elector
shares, say N, the maximum number of scrap mixed-share electors is N-1.
The process we use to determine assignment of the scrap mixed-share
electors is further described in its own section.
It has a bit of length
with extended subtleties to consider and is indeed anal, but once described in detail its procedures
illustrate its overall intent and justifications despite its intricacies.
Elector Strategy & Representative Options
Concerning the actual convening of the electoral college, the
electors by then should coalesce about favored main candidates in an effort to
determine a majority winner. If there is no final electoral vote majority and/or if there
were no applicable scrap mixed-share electors beforehand in need of the process mentioned
above (the partial electors cancelled out) then the presidency is determined according to
Amendment XII which is designed for such events.
* It may be desired
that an average of the states' votes within the house & senate Bicameral
II scheme be calculated and then applied uniformly across all states'
current elector allocations and then resolving mixed electors. This will
yield the same numerical end result for the election. Still, some states may
want to have more reflective results of their own tallies or to display
whole elector 'samplers' of the candidates who reached a certain threshold
percentage in their state. Various routines with more or less swapping and
calculation can be agreed to amongst the states, all while retaining the
same end national elector counts for the candidates.
And while still retaining those end national
elector count results, states may also wish to employ as some of their
electors for the presidential camps those who have been previous residents
of other states. Such appointments may be done in appreciation of larger
states accepting the plan or by larger states to display the congressional
proportions of smaller states they carry. Such a method may yield a more
well-rounded, national background choice for president especially if the
electoral college vote comes down to a wire decided by a certain subset of
electors. The several states may wish to mutually determine their
previous resident elector proportions with a good number of them California
emigrants.
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Recursion of National Model to the States
This plan's called-for appointment of senators and its house &
senate electoral college should also be applied at the state level in regards to
state senators and gubernatorial races respectively. States may opt to let current state senators
stay in office and run for successive terms on a yes-no popular vote basis. If they
lose office or resign, then the county seat in question can begin appointing senators. Of course, unicameral state legislatures can remain as such.
However, a state like Nebraska may wish to have their choice for each unicameral state senator halved between the people
in the district and the other half of the choice determined by the outcome of the relevant
county commissioner races, thus concurring more indepth with the bicameral electoral college model. A method employing
weighted representations for commissioner races within senate districts is described in the section ahead.
{You may skip the following enclosed section if your state does not use senatorial districts for its legislature.}
Appointing State Senators Via Senatorial Districts
Concerning the appointment of state senators for states with senatorial districts, we
put forth this new method which is even more unconventional than the previous version
yet it seems to be the only conceivable fair method at this point. So, for this argument, we assume county commissioner districts parcelled by
near equal populations and senatorial districts which may cross county lines and
may even divvy county commissioner districts. Thus for states employing such senatorial districts,
those districts will appoint state senators by the following:
- Divvied County Commissioner Districts: If any one of the county commissioner districts
is divvied by the state senatorial boundary, then all whole commissioner districts and the remaining partial commissioner districts (henceforth called 'areas' )
contained within will together appoint senators via all their non at-large county commissioner candidates
from the most recent or concurrent election. Each candidate's share of the vote
towards senator appointment will be in proportion to the number of votes
cast for them within that senatorial district for county commissioner relative to the overall votes cast from within the senatorial
district for such races. As suspected, the overall votes here do not include the ones cast for the at-large
county commissioner candidates. If the rules say appointers must reside in the senatorial district and a particular
candidate does not, then said candidate will delegate a trusted residential alderman, official or commoner to carry out appointment on the candidate's
behalf.
- Non-Divvied County Commissioner Districts: When a senatorial district contains
only whole commissioner districts, then the county commissioners of those
districts vote to appoint the state senator for that district. If preferred, the candidate method for
divvied districts can be employed as an option here as it can
apply to whole districts. Again we reserve inclusion of at-large candidates for the next section.
- Appointment Process Concerning The At-Large County Commissioner Candidates: In all cases with senatorial districts
involving the above methods, each at-large county commissioner candidate
will have their vote for a senator weighted relative to the candidate's proportion
of the total popular vote for at-large candidates cast within the senatorial district -- regardless of county
affiliations. Non-resident, at-large candidates
may delegate their vote to trusted residents of the senatorial district in the same manner as described above at
the end of the first bulleted section.
Within each senatorial district the power of at-large and district-bound commissioner candidates will be properly combined towards a conclusion for a state senator.
Notice that the candidates may or may not be the county commissioner officeholders for
the districts and areas in question. Observe as well that candidates from different
counties may be voting for state senator within the same senatorial district which has crossed county lines. It is also possible for candidates to partake in
more than one senatorial district appointment process, but again with relative weights
toward each function.
Real Debates and Party Delegates
Returning to the selection of the chief executive, there should be real presidential debates
held in various state legislatures where none of the participating presidential candidates
are a state resident nor have notable work or home relationships with those states. The legislators will present questions to the candidates concerning
state issues and how a candidate will lean in federal-state relations.
Should political parties adopt the attributes of the
bicameral electoral college in their state-by-state delegate selections for
their national conventions?
Paper Trail to Insure Against Contested Ballots
Addressing concern over contested electors like in 2000, improvements to the
polls should be made. How about if the voter can detach a perforated ballot stub
just like a concert ticket where the stub
has a matching number or barcode to the ballot? Voters should opt to put a string of innocuous information on their own ballot to strengthen their 'ownership' claim.
This string could be attributes such
as: gender, height, hair color, eye color, shoe size -- whatever. Then if there is any
problem with the system, voters can return and verify their choices. Voters should also
be able to verify the log of their choices in the election database via methods that
guard voter privacy and secure against hacking and fraud.
Impartiality Towards Methods
Here's some general advice: When considering certain options for implementing the above reformed electoral college, consult the impartialities of
mathematicians and statisticians as opposed to undue special interests, overly partisan and bipartisan commissions and
gerrymanderers. If you cannot decide on one method, compromise by alternating methods every election or
use some sort of social demographic indicator as when to switch methods.
Comparison
Now compare both of our proposals: the original (Bicam I) and this appended version (Bicam II) to the national popular vote argument. Overall, our plans should
bring more consistency and balance in choosing presidents. We think you need an electoral
system that is keeping powers in check and making candidates really do their
homework in approaching and then governing as president on behalf of your state. Plus, presidential campaigns will
become less banal with wider competition as they should be.
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED
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| State
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Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes
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Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation*
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Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method)
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| AL
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
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| AK
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
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| AZ
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
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| AR
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
| CA
|
55
|
65.55
|
37.97
|
| CO
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
|
| CT
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
| DE
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
| FL
|
27
|
30.92
|
20.70
|
| GA
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
| HI
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
| ID
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
| IL
|
21
|
23.50
|
17.00
|
| IN
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
| IA
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
| KS
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
| KY
|
8
|
7.42
|
8.98
|
| LA
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
|
| ME
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
| MD
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
| MA
|
12
|
12.37
|
11.44
|
| MI
|
17
|
18.55
|
14.53
|
| MN
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
| MS
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
| MO
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
| MT
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
| NE
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
| NV
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
| NH
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
| NJ
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
| NM
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
| NY
|
31
|
35.87
|
23.17
|
| NC
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
| ND
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
| OH
|
20
|
22.26
|
16.38
|
| OK
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
| OR
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
| PA
|
21
|
23.50
|
17.00
|
| RI
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
| SC
|
8
|
7.42
|
8.98
|
| SD
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
| TN
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
| TX
|
34
|
39.58
|
25.02
|
| UT
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
| VT
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
| VA
|
13
|
13.60
|
12.06
|
| WA
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
| WV
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
| WI
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
| WY
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
|
|
|
|
| DC
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the
relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote
elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed
to the minimum allotted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote
takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes"
where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate.
CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED
Congressional House Representatives = 435, Senators = 100 Electoral College Electors = 538 (3 for D.C.)
Bicameral II House Denominator = 436 (added one for D.C.) Bicam II Senate Denominator = 51 (added one for D.C.)
Bicam II National 'House' or 'Senate' Electors: 538/2 = 269
Current Electors Per State: (state's # US house reps) + (state's # US senators)
National Popular Vote's Effective Range Elector Allocation: (state's # US house reps / 435) X 538
Bicameral Electoral College II Elector Allocation: (state's # US house reps / 436) X 269 + (269/51)
Electors are rounded to two decimal points in the table for mere simplicity. They will be carried out
to significant digits in execution.
|
|
As you can see, the popular vote method is backward since it gives additional electors to
states who already have sizeable advantages while it takes away votes from small
states who already have little voice in the electoral college. Bicameral Electoral College II
does the opposite. It gives more votes to small states by allocating a base number of equal votes
to all states before allocating the other half of the votes by population. Our current all-or-nothing electoral college method is somewhere in between
while awarding results for most states totally to only one candidate. Our first proposal,
Bicam I, allocates electoral vote strength the same as the current method but halves each state's electors between
the state legislature and the state's popular vote and rounds off proportional suffrage for candidates in each state. Bicameral Electoral College I can be used in lieu of or until all states implement
Bicameral Electoral College II. Remember in Bicam II that fractional allocations and partial electoral vote results are
combined and sorted amongst the states to eventually reach a number of whole electoral votes for all candidates after the scrap mixed-share electors
are processed separately.
While the larger states do lose noticeable electoral votes in the Bicameral II method, they
are still a few magnitudes above the smaller states and do not lose relatively much influence in that
regard. Notice too that the spreads between the larger states are narrowed...
SOME LARGE RIVAL STATE SPREADS COMPARED
|
| States
|
Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes
|
Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation*
|
Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method)
|
| CA
|
55
|
65.55
|
37.97
|
| NY
|
31
|
35.87
|
23.17
|
| SPREAD:
|
24
|
29.68
|
14.80
|
| CA/NY:
|
1.77
|
1.83
|
1.64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CA
|
55
|
65.55
|
37.97
|
| FL
|
27
|
30.92
|
20.70
|
| SPREAD:
|
28
|
34.63
|
17.27
|
| CA/FL:
|
2.04
|
2.12
|
1.83
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| NY
|
31
|
35.87
|
23.17
|
| FL
|
27
|
30.92
|
20.70
|
| SPREAD:
|
4
|
4.95
|
2.47
|
| NY/FL:
|
1.15
|
1.16
|
1.12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| TX
|
34
|
39.58
|
25.02
|
| PA
|
21
|
23.50
|
17.00
|
| SPREAD:
|
13
|
16.08
|
8.02
|
| TX/PA:
|
1.62
|
1.68
|
1.47
|
Keep in mind the partial suffrage in each state of the proposed bicameral electoral college and how that will effect
the incentive of the duelling candidates as opposed to all-or-nothing allocation. Now solely considering elector strengths, we note in the
above table that while the spreads between the big states are narrowed
with still comfortable leads for the bigger states, the comparative large state
magnitudes remain near stable throughout in most cases or exhibit a substantial retention. This is like the best of both worlds -- big states are more competitive with bigger states by electoral spreads while bigger states can retain most of their relative advantages. So despite California
losing a substantial number of electoral votes and having its lead over other rival
big states narrowed (Bicams II & III), California still yields a lot of influence in the new system compared with all states.
For compensation, California interests can opt to persuade the other states' legislators
since all state legislatures will determine almost half of the national electoral college (w/ DC). California may also consider
influencing the popular presidential vote in other states or the state legislative races themselves in various states. Since the smaller states will have higher elector to population ratios, would these approaches save on campaign dollars to achieve the desired electors? Or whatever dollars spent, do campaigns get more for their money within this system in pursuit of a better nation?
The Bicam II electoral proportions for California and the other states are nearly the same as to what they
have agreed to in the Congress. Since the proportions work well for the
states in choosing our national legislation, why would they not agree to use similar allocations in
choosing presidents?........
|
BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III
Popular & Legislative Elector Proportions Check House & Senate Representations
Bicameral II is a good system since it gives the states about the same amount of
representation in the electoral college that they have in the Congress while emulating a
house and senate structure. While Congress deals with the passage of bills which are
inanimate, congressional representatives are chosen and respondent to their constituencies of much
smaller size than the total presidential constituency. Thus the people have some interactive access and influence to the direction of the
federal government in the passage of bills. As a collective the representatives
can steer legislation on behalf of the people by each district. Somewhat similar can be said of senators though their
domain is statewide. Currently they are elected and
swayed by their state populations but all senators have equal representation regardless
of the size of their state. Ideally, they would have been indirectly determined by the people through
the elected state governments.
Anyway, the office of president has a very large constituency
that consists of all those districts and states and there will be only one officeholder who
will be even more difficult for the voters in sparser states to reach against the masses. That officeholder
will sign or veto bills passed by those senators of equal weight from states of varying sizes and likewise bills passed by the
population-based House. A presidential electoral structure that serves as a check on those equal and population characteristics
of the congressional houses may be desirable for the executive branch. As well, we note that
Bicam II's near congressional intrastate proportions while acceptable for the counterpart senators and representatives
may not carry over as ideally in getting the attentions of presidential candidates though they are an improvement over
the current system and Bicam I in some respects.
Notice that with Bicam II's legislative half, the smaller states may
feel that their popular vote towards the president is squelched by their noticeably
larger legislative vote and vice versa for the larger states. Accordingly we here put
forth a Bicameral Electoral College III.
Bicameral Electoral College III will be a combination of Bicam I and Bicam II that has the same
electoral allocations to the states as Bicam II but gives equal voice to the legislative and popular vote
within each state like in Bicam I. The total standing
given to each state is almost what it is in Congress since D.C. acts as a state
and obtains its share through Amendment XXIII.
With Bicam III the president is determined by
an electoral system that addresses all the concerns stated previously in the second paragraph. In Bicam III you will notice that the smaller states'
popular vote is enhanced and the larger states' legislative vote is enhanced
while both voting blocks are equal to each other within each state and so getting same consideration
by a president or candidate for a particular state. The national total electoral vote is
still half-and-half legislative and popular as it was in Bicam I & II. So by the observed enhancement inversions, certain popular or
legislative voices are more competitive state to state and within a state. Bicam III
may also work as a check to the congressional side since bills over there
emanate from senators as equals and dually from a representation proportionally allotted amongst the states. Inversely, Bicam III will lean toward a president
who may be more conscience of passing legislation on governments indexed to states of various sizes
while accounting for the more compensatory/competitive shares of the states' popular vote. This is all the while
retaining the states' foundational equal footing and their just advantages by population
in their overall electoral allocations.
Some states may opt to still use the Bicam II method from within for
whatever reasons (gerrymandering issues, countering corruption in a legislature, voter irregularities). This is feasible and fine. A little variance is good and may keep
things interesting and the candidates on their toes. And yes, we envision each legislative vote to be the average of the proportions
of each house.
Choosing Vice Presidents
Since the electoral college electors are instructed to vote on separate ballots for the offices
of president and of vice-president, the popular and legislative votes should effectively
do likewise by having those offices appear as separate races on any single ballot. This follows the example of some
political third parties who carry out an analogous protocol in the selection of vice-presidential candidates. This arrangement would provide more choice
and make way for an intriguing check on the office of president or it could embed a needed political readjustment
in case of a succession of power. Presidential candidates may opt to endorse a particular vice-presidential candidate
or still pick a mate dependent on the bylaws of their particular party, but the people and state legislatures would
determine the vice-president in the end despite party affiliations. Each presidential campaign
camp should in addition to their core electors find enough reliable and state-registered presidential electors for their own candidate
who will also support all the possible vice-presidential candidates. Some mixtures may be
odd or harder to find, but if enough show up in the general election results then
there should be enough as well in the elector harvest fields. Thus, the electoral college
will ideally be poised to reflect the presidential and vice-presidential results of the
election.
Old or New Legislatures?
Should the old or the new legislature determined via the presidential election in question produce the state's legislative electoral vote? One could make
cases for both scenarios. Perhaps both can do it by averaging their votes together. Or maybe a candidate-weighted
method should be used similar to how states with senatorial districts determine their
state senators as described in Bicam II's enclosed section.
Rural or Urban Adjustments?
Further still, your legislature may also
consider this mode of operation: In a state where there is a higher extreme ratio of
urban to rural presidential districts (or for any other districts used in presidential elections) then that state's popular vote by district may weigh the rural districts a bit more
in similar notion to how the national electoral college compensates the smaller states. Conversely, make the urban districts' weights higher for the extreme rural to urban states.
Such would occur in a state when its metropolitan areas' issues are not as noticeable to the national
media which may tend to cover that state's stereotypical rural concerns. In the more developed states, the opposite may happen when the media concentration, access and attention takes place in the more cosmopolitan areas
and not as much in the rural.
Additionally, such adjustments to rural or urban weights could more aptly apply to the particular counties within a state analogous to the nation's overall
electoral college compensatory structure. It may turn out that the ratios are not as described above nor prerequisite and that the
adjustments are more dependent upon whether or not the concentration,
access and attention of the media or of the powers or populace that be
within a state are notably unbalanced. As well, the controversy may be
over other attributes besides rural or urban. Regardless, the
determination of adjustments (if any) should be kept guarded against
arbitrary or more trivial justifications and not too large in magnitude.
We leave it to you to discuss and determine how your state will perform
such tasks.
|
NOTE: In concert with the bicameral electoral college plans, we strongly promote
the adoption of range voting for any and all elections. Range (or score) voting will be
a revolutionary dynamic between representative government and the people. The details
of which can be found in the link section following the table below.
ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED (TABLE II)
|
| State
|
Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes
|
Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation*
|
Bicameral Electoral College III Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method)
|
Bicam III Electoral Split (Half of State's Electors Allocated to Popular/Legislative Vote)
|
| AL
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
|
4.79
|
| AK
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| AZ
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
5.10
|
| AR
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
3.87
|
| CA
|
55
|
65.55
|
37.97
|
18.98
|
| CO
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
|
4.79
|
| CT
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
4.18
|
| DE
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| FL
|
27
|
30.92
|
20.70
|
10.35
|
| GA
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
6.65
|
| HI
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
3.25
|
| ID
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
3.25
|
| IL
|
21
|
23.50
|
17.00
|
8.50
|
| IN
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
5.41
|
| IA
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
4.18
|
| KS
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
3.87
|
| KY
|
8
|
7.42
|
8.98
|
4.49
|
| LA
|
9
|
8.66
|
9.59
|
4.79
|
| ME
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
3.25
|
| MD
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
5.10
|
| MA
|
12
|
12.37
|
11.44
|
5.72
|
| MI
|
17
|
18.55
|
14.53
|
7.26
|
| MN
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
5.10
|
| MS
|
6
|
4.95
|
7.74
|
3.87
|
| MO
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
5.41
|
| MT
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| NE
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
3.56
|
| NV
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
3.56
|
| NH
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
3.25
|
| NJ
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
6.65
|
| NM
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
3.56
|
| NY
|
31
|
35.87
|
23.17
|
11.58
|
| NC
|
15
|
16.08
|
13.30
|
6.65
|
| ND
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| OH
|
20
|
22.26
|
16.38
|
8.19
|
| OK
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
4.18
|
| OR
|
7
|
6.18
|
8.36
|
4.18
|
| PA
|
21
|
23.50
|
17.00
|
8.50
|
| RI
|
4
|
2.47
|
6.51
|
3.25
|
| SC
|
8
|
7.42
|
8.98
|
4.49
|
| SD
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| TN
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
5.41
|
| TX
|
34
|
39.58
|
25.02
|
12.51
|
| UT
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
3.56
|
| VT
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
| VA
|
13
|
13.60
|
12.06
|
6.03
|
| WA
|
11
|
11.13
|
10.83
|
5.41
|
| WV
|
5
|
3.71
|
7.13
|
3.56
|
| WI
|
10
|
9.89
|
10.21
|
5.10
|
| WY
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
|
|
|
|
|
| DC
|
3
|
1.24
|
5.89
|
2.94
|
*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the
relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote
elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed
to the minimum allotted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote
takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes"
where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate.
CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED
Congressional House Representatives = 435, Senators = 100 Electoral College Electors = 538 (3 for D.C.)
Bicameral III House Denominator = 436 (added one for D.C.) Bicam III Senate Denominator = 51 (added one for D.C.)
Bicam III National 'House' or 'Senate' Electors: 538/2 = 269
Current Electors Per State: (state's # US house reps) + (state's # US senators)
National Popular Vote's Effective Range Elector Allocation: (state's # US house reps / 435) X 538
Bicameral Electoral College III Elector Allocation: (state's # US house reps / 436) X 269 + (269/51)
Bicam III State Legislative & Popular Vote Split: (state's # Bicam III State Electors) / 2
Electors are rounded to two decimal points in the table for mere simplicity. They will be carried out
to significant digits in execution.
|
|
LINKS
Here are a few sites that have more information about the electoral college,
presidential elections and election systems in general.
Elections Central contains historical
facts, popular and electoral results of past presidential elections. There are also
a few essays on election topics.
Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections has various election maps
for primaries and caucuses of the country broken down state-by-state and in various
graph forms as well. Analysis and predictions for current races are also featured.
Election Results 2008 - The New York Times presents results of the 2008 elections displayed on a zoomable US map with state, county tallies and voting shifts from previous elections.
Maps of the 2008 US presidential election results ~ This site posted by a university researcher shows the usual red/blue state and county maps indicating the presidential election results but also included are cartograms which change the relative sizes of the states or counties by population. One cartogram shows relative sizes of the states by their number of allotted electoral college votes. Another map incorporates red, blue or purple hues to indicate a more sliding scale representation of the tallies by county in its cartogram.
PresidentialElection.com ~ Site description says: 'Non-partisan 2010-2012 Presidential Election information and directory including government, state, and local election information. Our promise is to create a more educated voter and a more responsible government by providing accurate information that is available anywhere in the world.'
Federal Register - Electoral College Home Page ~ Office of the Federal Register's web page on the
Electoral College.
Constitution Party - Electoral College Plank:
Short of getting a bicameral electoral college, the congressional district approach with
two statewide at-large electors is a good fall-back plan and would be a step in
the right direction away from the current system.
Center for Range Voting explains range (or score)
voting and its superior attributes compared to other voting systems. Range voting
is used in olympic competitions. Everyone can express their opinion
about all candidates by rating each on a scale without having to worry
about impeding their favorite one or 'wasting' votes on underdogs. It encourages more
honest results, protects against exaggerations and chooses the best candidate. Results of
range voting could determine shares of the bicameral electoral college. Then a majority candidate would be determined from there. Please
visit this important site!
Range Vote: A Better Way To Vote ~ A video on the advantages of range voting.
|
|