BICAMERAL
ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM


Revitalizing Presidential Selection




Capitol from State St. in Madison, WI



Quick state-by-state allocation comparison tables start past the middle of this page.

Latest Revisions are under the Hyperlinked Page Index.












Hyperlinked Page Index


Summary Bicameral Electoral College I Bicameral Electoral College II Bicameral Electoral College III Electoral College Methods Compared Rival State Spreads Electoral College Methods Compared:
Table II
Links









LATEST REVISIONS: 7/5/10






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If you find need of change in text or to the methods within, your request or any questions can be e-mailed to us. You may still want to check back every once in a while in case there is news regarding the electoral college topics within.







[Newer or revised text within may appear green including the text via these links.]






Subheadings added to page text.


New links in the LINKS Section.


The refined process to determine the assignment of the scrap mixed-share electors has now been posted. [Link amongst the olive green text as 'SECTION'.]


In states like Connecticut and Rhode Island with no functioning county governments, a caucus of aldermen may choose state senators. For population segments outside of place or town designations, selected residents and/or perhaps selected local officials such as law enforcement or emergency service personnel in jurisdiction may be chosen to attend the caucus. (No incorporated text to link to.)


Another check to compensate popular voters against glaring wayward appointments from party state reps or county commissioner candidates or when all such candidates wish to appoint same (type) of presidential candidates or state senators. {Linked: COMPENSATIONS }


State legislators campaign their presidential preferences. Their finalized votes posted before polls open on election day.


What to do when a district's result does not yield a majority candidate. ( 1st green sentence in that paragraph.)


Text added to Bicam III on option to weigh rural or urban districts more in relatively extreme states.


Blurb added about averaging the popular and district methods concerning a state's whole popular vote.( Last green sentence in Bicam I section.)


Split ticket for presidential and vice-presidential races to achieve parity with electoral college protocol.


Summary section for Bicameral Electoral College Plan added.


Opting some electors to be previous residents of other states. ( 'And while still retaining...' )





(Older Revisions)


New terminology: 'mixed elector' better differentiates from 'fractional elector' and 'partial elector'. (Bicam II)


Section addressing contested elections added. (Bicam II)


Appointment of State Senators -- Updated on States w/ Senate Districts (Bicam II)


BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III


State popular vote allocations (Bicam II) [In green.]

Average of Bicam II applied to current electors.

Presidential Debate Forums











SUMMARY




Depending on the population of your state, your state my gain or lose electors in Bicameral Electoral College Plans II and III. However, Bicameral Electoral College I keeps the same elector allocations in terms of number that we have now. All the plans introduce some type of proportional representation amongst the candidates within each state's elector slate. The total national electors are split with one half indicating the popular vote and the other half according to the vote of the state legislatures. Bicam II and III introduce congressional weightings to each state's slate of electors via interstate sharing. This will result in partial and fractional elector allocations, but they will be combined and swapped amongst the states to restore whole electors. The Constitution's original elector allocations will reflect the result of all this through each state assigning its current electors in such a manner that the congressional-weighted proportions of the Bicameral Electoral College effectively determine a winner.




Here is a list form of the attributes of the Bicameral Electoral College Plans:



* Each state's share of electors is akin to their relative share of power in the Congress -- an electoral college 'house' and 'senate' (versions II & III). States cooperatively use current elector allocations to achieve this. No amending of the Constitution required.

* Legislatures will directly determine half of the total national electoral allocation.

* Electors on behalf of each state will reflect the candidates' share of various popular and legislative vote allocations dependent on the version implemented.

* Fractional, partial and mixed electors are combined/swapped amongst the states to eventually arrive at a national result with all electors allocated as wholes to particular candidates after a determination process on behalf of the final scrap mixed-share electors.

* Presidential debates in various state legislatures will introduce state issues to presidential selection.

* Senatorial appointments and gubernatorial electoral colleges are recommended.




It is now important that the state legislatures consider these compensational maneuvers in the selection of presidential electors to facilitate better governance from the victor. Consider how the third-party candidates will effect the outcome of the race in the current system and in alternative systems like the Bicameral Electoral College proposal. Which is more beneficiary overall, more equitable, more fair to the various voters and states?

Please take the time to study the plan and its nuances. You will need to know the points to argue for it on your debate floors. For reference, there are state-by-state tables of the plan starting after the middle of this web page.


Thanks for your time.










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BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE I



Intro

First some background: The legislative branch is composed of two houses -- the House of Representatives which allocates representation to each state dependent upon population and the Senate which allows each state to have an equal number of senators, namely two. All legislation must pass approval by both houses and must be signed by the president to become effective law. The president can veto legislation denying its passage, but his veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the Congress via both houses. Such is part of the system of 'checks and balances' that keeps our government self-regulating against undue powers and tyranny or at least impeding them (in theory at least).

Having a Senate and a House of Representatives as described above was a compromise which kept small states from being totally drowned-out when voting on national laws while still retaining the just advantage of more populous states which is their greater net representation in the national congress. This bicameral compromise addresses both concerns and splits Congress half-and-half. Each house has a say on national legislation and each effectively has half of the power of Congress when it comes to the passage of laws -- one house votes with states as equals and the other house with states allotted votes according to relative populations.



Checks, Balances, Legislatures

Now if you oppose the electoral college, then you are also opposing a seedling of the nifty House and Senate compromise. Plus you are opposing the college's intermediary checks and balances and the opportunity for us to get the states to more closely match the mathematical function of the House and Senate when choosing a president. This is because the electoral college allocates to each state a number of electors for choosing the president which is equal to the number of senators and representatives that state has by both houses. So, if we constantly use that type of allocated representation for the passage of our national laws, why would we not employ similar mathematical principle in choosing a national leader?

The Constitution grants every state legislature the sole power to determine how those allocated electors are selected on behalf of their state to the electoral college. State legislatures used to appoint US senators and they ratify amendments to our constitution. So legislatures have intended function at the federal level. Until 1824, over a quarter of state legislatures were choosing presidential electors. Our earliest presidential races had substantially higher proportions than that choosing electors as opposed to total popular election of electoral college electors as we have today. Now you see that state legislatures choosing presidents directly is not out of the question.

As the archival presidential elections show, the founders desired not just checks and balances between government branches, but they also wanted checks and balances between government and the people as well -- functioning in both directions. This is because the founders knew the people could be swayed by radicals and mass movements possibly of tyrants or anti-Christ figures. An electoral college would possibly serve as an obstacle or delay to the acquiring of the presidency by such individuals since electors are not subject to office privileges or re-election nor are they the people voting directly. They can opt to act on their own accord thus serving as an intermediary check on presidential prospects. Electors too are subject to check and balance as they can pay penalties for not providing their promised vote. So when someone is about to essentially become a third of our national government, shouldn't the above elaborate system of checks be utilized on their acquisition of power? Shouldn't that choice be subdivided by states and by state populations just like our national government structure?

The privilege granted to you to vote for electoral college electors is an accommodation of your state legislature who feels you can be trusted at this time and thinks the masses are of stable enough mind, within sound reason and perceives the society as functionable and at relative peace. However, with today's goings on you have to begin to wonder if this is still a valid perspective or if ever allowing for a sole popular vote determination should ever have been dabbled with.

As stated above the checks and balances can work in reverse direction as well. Say if a group of electors were chosen by a state legislature and that group votes against a candidate where the people feel all this was done in an air of frivolity or without due regard, the people will focus their punishment on the state legislature in the following (or concurrent) election. Ideally, legislators with scruples would more likely only take such risk of retaliation if they felt that the people's interests were bent or the Republic faced trouble with a prospective national leader.



Powers of Representation

Before trying to do away with our important electoral college check, consider Canada. They determine their prime minister through the majority or by the plurality of seats won by a particular party in the representative house. While they do have a senate, the representative body is usually where the prime minister is derived from. Since this house is based on population, the national leader and the executive direction can solely be determined by the more populated eastern provinces while the western provinces garner substantially less influence. Thus, their national leaders are more skewed towards the views and concerns of the big east provinces. This is one reason there are growing secession sentiments and movements in western Canada. Without more electoral college balance, America may suffer in a similar fashion with New York, California, Texas, Florida and several other big states solely determining the outcome for president. It would be worse than it is now without an electoral college to give some boost to the smaller states. Actually, the current electoral college form usually does agree with the popular vote most of the time except for a few occasions. So why should popular vote purists bother to get rid of it altogether? The few times it has diverted from the popular vote it was probably a needed check to do so.

If you wish to complain about the electoral college, you should do so by focusing on the method your state legislature allows for elector selection. Mathematically, most states employ the all-or-nothing mode whereby all electors to the electoral college for a state are unanimously determined by winner of the state's popular vote. There are some advantages to having all-or-nothing in the current system. It will make candidates for president cater more strongly to the interests of your state or its majority in order to get all your state's electoral points. If your state is a smaller state it keeps you more competitive with the larger ones within that system. However, what if an opposing candidate wins? If they only have support of the minority in your state, they will have less incentive to accommodate your state in governing. If it is not as close a race in your state, will they opt to campaign in other states with closer races instead of vying for your state? Will candidates see your state as one big blob and carry a watered-down, disingenuous, common denominator stance towards you or would it be better if they could appeal more to the various regional issues in your state? You may wish to consider the pros and cons as there are many possible outcomes.

Technically, perhaps the current all-or-nothing system may have been thought of as a safety back in the day when travel was harsh, there were no instantaneous mass communications and there were no computers. Today, however, all of these amenities exist. Campaigns can travel anywhere quickly and the issues are more exposed to the masses. Ballots can be counted quicker and easier. So there is less cause to unanimously round up elector counts each state. Thus the more regional interests could shape races and hold their sway in close or not-so-close elections. If we were awarding a state's allocated electors by some kind of proportional showings, candidates would take interest in your state whether or not their polling was sufficiently beyond 50% as in today's system.

Considering relative representation amongst the states, the smaller states are boosted via electors in the electoral college but there is a stronger leaning towards population share in comparison to the Congress. For advancement, one plan we would consider is adhering the electoral college selection more closely to the proportions and original principle of the Senate and House compromise. So, during normal peaceful times with the masses of sound mind, we would encourage each state to select its allotted electors by allowing half to be determined by the state legislature. The other half would be chosen such that the proportion nearly reflects the popular vote of the state either by congressional (or smaller) districts or just the popular statewide vote. The former by district is more of a demographic method that reflects political distribution and densities, trends or infrastructure. It may indicate how a state politically operates at a closer level -- the majority momentum of communities on the ground.



Popular Vote By Districts or Statewide Proportions?

The district method provides an incentive for candidates to address majority concerns parsed through non-sovereign entities of equal populations within a state which can reflect the weight of regional issues. From a national vantage point, it is noticeably different from having vast sovereign states of various sizes acting as unanimous blobs to their common-denominator. An intrastate district method is consistent with how the U.S. House Representatives are selected. However, in some cases the district method could conceivably vary greatly in outcome from the popular statewide vote and go more towards unanimity due to effectively binary races with intra-district results that favor one candidate against any of the others across almost all districts. Thus, the latter method of employing the statewide popular vote result to the second half of electors presents an option. One may prefer this option as a check or counter balance to the district method that is used for the actual U.S. House selection. It also acts as a counter to the concerns of gerrymandering.

While it recognizes the contribution of every single ballot, a popular vote could be more prone to any concerns over statewide populism. Because of that, one may still prefer use of the district method which again provides for a consistency with the congressional selection scheme. Note that when the results of a race in a particular district do not yield a (threshold) majority or a threshold plurality victor, that district's tally will simply resort to the popular vote proportions for the candidates in that district. Generally, it depends on numerous circumstances whether the popular or district method better reflects the political interests of a state. For a compromise, average both together. Regardless of which option chosen, another version of the plan is to allow a third of the allotted electors to be selected by the state supreme court. Should some electors be chosen by a governor? It is interesting in itself to debate the possibilities.



Overview and Our Demand

The advantages to this plan are substantial for consideration. The nation would less likely be held hostage to just a few swing states during close elections. The several states would be more empowered because electors from each state are also allocated by state legislatures which brings state concerns and issues to the table. The legislatures' choice and the partitioned popular vote by each state can put more emphasis on regional topics. Also the smaller several states have a greater number (and perhaps proportion) of state governments for candidates to contend with and to be discerned by as opposed to just dealing with the fewer larger states' block vote. State legislators gain with their races garnering more attention since they will have an effect on presidential outcomes which means voters have even more incentive to turn out for state level elections. Overall, voters are more adequately represented using the conjunction of an intrastate popular or district vote along with the voter-determined state legislatures choosing electors. This is opposed to the current all-or-nothing popular vote across a state currently in use which gives no electoral voice to the minority.

There is a caveat to our plan. Originally, the U.S. Senate was intended to be comprised of senators who were chosen by state governments so that state governments would have representation and a check with the federal level. That would include a check and balance with the direct representatives of the people elected to the House. Today, we have no such thing since we elect senators by popular vote. Despite the Senate having some unique impeachment and other functions, it's popular make-up basically results in a functional two-house redundancy check-and-balance wise. Also, wouldn't senate appointments by a state insulate against large statewide, big-money campaigns that many complain about?

With the case being that the general populace has total monopoly in voting for the legislative and executive branches and perhaps until we re-establish state appointment of U.S. senators -- then the electoral college should be determined totally by state legislatures. State legislatures need some amount of voice and power returned to them at the federal level. Once senatorial appointment is resumed, then our aforementioned plan of combining popular vote with legislature-determined electoral college electors half-and-half by state would be initiated. (During the period of state legislatures totality, you will still have voice towards presidential selection because you determine the make-up of your state legislature. As noted above, popular vote determines 2/3 of national government, the states 0/3. By this caveat, that would rebalance it 1/3::1/3)

At any rate, we support the preservation of the electoral college while considering revamping it at state level to more closely resemble the congressional House and Senate compromise taking into account their effective bicameral proportions.




TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THIS: We consider the current times to be thwarted, skewed and have long been unfairly biased in favor of the Republican and Democrat candidates for decades through government campaign funding and manipulated ballot access. Thus to make up for all the years of untrue elections, we believe it fair and proper that for the next presidential election all of you pressure your state legislatures to allow only the selection of third-party and independent electors for president (or at least vice president) in the electoral college. This is on account of the long past and current electoral grievances. This would be a proper, compensatory check and balance.









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ADDENDUM:



BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE II





Justification for an Alternative Pact

A sizeable number of state legislatures are considering a pact where the several states will choose presidential electors in such a manner that the electoral college merely reflects a national popular vote winner unanimously, thereby nullifying the electoral college's numerical properties. The arguments for this are that swing states of the current system beckon too much influence and that the current all-or-nothing allocation of electors by each state does not reflect a particular state's voter proportions. They also argue that the smaller states are still too overshadowed by the larger states. We agree with the first two current system disadvantages and thus have instituted our own electoral college proposal above. We also concur with the third concern of smaller state representations by the current nominal allocations of electors. However, one reason why the electoral college exists to begin with is to compensate for the smaller state representations. It boosts the proportional share of votes for the smaller states by allocating two extra electors for every state (by Senate representation) along with the population-based elector allocations (by number of House representatives). Resorting to a national popular vote will in fact erase that extra boost for the smaller states. Obviously, a popular vote will cater more to the larger states proportion-wise since they have larger populations and thus more votes weighted in a popular election.

Note too that America's foundational checks and balances distribute power not only amongst three branches of government, but also amongst a hierarchy of national, state, local governments and the people. Our national laws are voted in through a house of popular representation and concurrently through a chamber where the states sit as equals -- both arrangements splitting the national legislative power equally. Having the senatorial side selected by the state governments was an ideal notion of state governments keeping check on the people and on the higher-leveled national government.

Therefore, if there is going to be a pact amongst the states as far as how they will choose their electors then let's have them allocate their CURRENT electors state by state in such a manner that half of the RESULTING total electors will represent the state legislatures' choices for president on an equal basis (just as it should happen for bills in the Senate). The other half of the total electors will simply reflect the popular vote of each state with ratios matching the House representative allocations. State popular tallies will either be determined by congressional (or smaller) districts or by statewide popular vote result. Thus, we would then effectively have a Senatorial electoral college and a House or at-large House (or combo thereof) electoral college with both colleges equally splitting the powers of choice between them which would be like or similar to the legislative branch structure.

Our original electoral college proposal (Bicameral I) is similar to this except that the comparative powers amongst the states weigh more towards relative population while still retaining electoral boosts for the smaller states. A national popular vote however, would simply negate those electoral boosts and provides no venue for state governments. Thus the national popular vote scheme also negates any way for an effective Senatorial electoral college even if it was to be popularly executed as we do our national senate today.



Electors Via State Legislators and County Commissioners

In our proposed electoral systems, the state government selection of electors for a president will be between you and your state legislature. In other words, you vote for president in more than one way. Your vote for the state legislature offices is also a vote towards a presidential selection. Thus how you govern your state will also influence the direction of the national executive branch. Once state senatorial appointment is achieved, this principle will also emanate from your county seat.

To accommodate an informed choice towards state legislators and instilling a check on them for their presidential stances during the campaign, the presidential leanings of all state legislators and candidates (or potential appointees) for the same should be made known during the relevant campaign period. Their stances should be officially finalized and posted at all polling places before the general public takes to the polls. A finalization deadline (their official presidential vote expressing their choice for legislative electors) could perhaps take place by something like 1:00am on election day. Similar deadline and posting takes place for county commissioners & candidates for same on their finalized choices for state senators by 2:00am.

For a further check on wayward appointments or as compensation for voters ever being "boxed-in" under unanimity of all state representative candidates' presidential choices or the analogous concerning all county commissioner candidates' choices for state senators, visit this link: COMPENSATIONS......



Smaller States as Leverage to Larger States

Now considering the boosting of the smaller states in the electoral college, this can preserve some leverage to the large states too. Hence forward they will not have to solely rely on countering their other big rivals themselves while smaller states would have been of little help on the few-elector sidelines. A large state can now convince smaller, more influenced states and their equal representations in the electoral college senate to help counter a more populous rival state in the electoral college house. So don't have a cow California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania & Florida! Seek influence on the near or border states that you have commerce with or those that simply may share a common concern. Those campaign dollars may obtain more electors towards your goals in the smaller states because of the higher proportion of electors to their populations. Still, the bigger states will have noticeable influence just like they do in the Congress with its similar proportions.



Obtaining the Most Representative Digital Electors to the Analog Election Results

And further, in an attempt to eliminate aggregate round-off error amongst the states' tally and to more accurately represent the results of the election -- all fractional, partial and mixed elector allocation results of the states ( & D.C.) will be combined, swapped and sorted until just any possible scrap mixed-share electors remain. Then a process comes into play that determines the allocation of those final scrap mixed-share electors. It first utilizes the inherent representation via the partial shares of the candidates involved and then if necessary it relies on those same candidates' overall trend exhibited in the rest of the electorate. Both should take precedence before having to resort to any outside bodies like the Congress, Supreme Court or random allocations -- all of which can be invoked successively in case of ties or perhaps other undeterminable circumstances. The process should weed-out approaches that can yield arbitrary results or inconsistencies. It should carry out as best as possible political representation and competition within those scrap mixed-share electors towards a localized victor using procedural rationale and ethical considerations, all of which will determine the mathematical model of its structure. We use this list of considerations as a reference in order to devise the various protocols and alternates reflecting those priorities.

Note: For the number of candidates with electoral college elector shares, say N, the maximum number of scrap mixed-share electors is N-1.

The process we use to determine assignment of the scrap mixed-share electors is further described in its own section. It has a bit of length with extended subtleties to consider and is indeed anal, but once described in detail its procedures illustrate its overall intent and justifications despite its intricacies.



Elector Strategy & Representative Options

Concerning the actual convening of the electoral college, the electors by then should coalesce about favored main candidates in an effort to determine a majority winner. If there is no final electoral vote majority and/or if there were no applicable scrap mixed-share electors beforehand in need of the process mentioned above (the partial electors cancelled out) then the presidency is determined according to Amendment XII which is designed for such events.



* It may be desired that an average of the states' votes within the house & senate Bicameral II scheme be calculated and then applied uniformly across all states' current elector allocations and then resolving mixed electors. This will yield the same numerical end result for the election. Still, some states may want to have more reflective results of their own tallies or to display whole elector 'samplers' of the candidates who reached a certain threshold percentage in their state. Various routines with more or less swapping and calculation can be agreed to amongst the states, all while retaining the same end national elector counts for the candidates.


And while still retaining those end national elector count results, states may also wish to employ as some of their electors for the presidential camps those who have been previous residents of other states. Such appointments may be done in appreciation of larger states accepting the plan or by larger states to display the congressional proportions of smaller states they carry. Such a method may yield a more well-rounded, national background choice for president especially if the electoral college vote comes down to a wire decided by a certain subset of electors. The several states may wish to mutually determine their previous resident elector proportions with a good number of them California emigrants.

~




Recursion of National Model to the States

This plan's called-for appointment of senators and its house & senate electoral college should also be applied at the state level in regards to state senators and gubernatorial races respectively. States may opt to let current state senators stay in office and run for successive terms on a yes-no popular vote basis. If they lose office or resign, then the county seat in question can begin appointing senators. Of course, unicameral state legislatures can remain as such. However, a state like Nebraska may wish to have their choice for each unicameral state senator halved between the people in the district and the other half of the choice determined by the outcome of the relevant county commissioner races, thus concurring more indepth with the bicameral electoral college model. A method employing weighted representations for commissioner races within senate districts is described in the section ahead.


{You may skip the following enclosed section if your state does not use senatorial districts for its legislature.}










Appointing State Senators Via Senatorial Districts

Concerning the appointment of state senators for states with senatorial districts, we put forth this new method which is even more unconventional than the previous version yet it seems to be the only conceivable fair method at this point. So, for this argument, we assume county commissioner districts parcelled by near equal populations and senatorial districts which may cross county lines and may even divvy county commissioner districts. Thus for states employing such senatorial districts, those districts will appoint state senators by the following:


  • Divvied County Commissioner Districts: If any one of the county commissioner districts is divvied by the state senatorial boundary, then all whole commissioner districts and the remaining partial commissioner districts (henceforth called 'areas' ) contained within will together appoint senators via all their non at-large county commissioner candidates from the most recent or concurrent election. Each candidate's share of the vote towards senator appointment will be in proportion to the number of votes cast for them within that senatorial district for county commissioner relative to the overall votes cast from within the senatorial district for such races. As suspected, the overall votes here do not include the ones cast for the at-large county commissioner candidates. If the rules say appointers must reside in the senatorial district and a particular candidate does not, then said candidate will delegate a trusted residential alderman, official or commoner to carry out appointment on the candidate's behalf.



  • Non-Divvied County Commissioner Districts: When a senatorial district contains only whole commissioner districts, then the county commissioners of those districts vote to appoint the state senator for that district. If preferred, the candidate method for divvied districts can be employed as an option here as it can apply to whole districts. Again we reserve inclusion of at-large candidates for the next section.



  • Appointment Process Concerning The At-Large County Commissioner Candidates: In all cases with senatorial districts involving the above methods, each at-large county commissioner candidate will have their vote for a senator weighted relative to the candidate's proportion of the total popular vote for at-large candidates cast within the senatorial district -- regardless of county affiliations. Non-resident, at-large candidates may delegate their vote to trusted residents of the senatorial district in the same manner as described above at the end of the first bulleted section.


Within each senatorial district the power of at-large and district-bound commissioner candidates will be properly combined towards a conclusion for a state senator. Notice that the candidates may or may not be the county commissioner officeholders for the districts and areas in question. Observe as well that candidates from different counties may be voting for state senator within the same senatorial district which has crossed county lines. It is also possible for candidates to partake in more than one senatorial district appointment process, but again with relative weights toward each function.











Real Debates and Party Delegates

Returning to the selection of the chief executive, there should be real presidential debates held in various state legislatures where none of the participating presidential candidates are a state resident nor have notable work or home relationships with those states. The legislators will present questions to the candidates concerning state issues and how a candidate will lean in federal-state relations.



Should political parties adopt the attributes of the bicameral electoral college in their state-by-state delegate selections for their national conventions?



Paper Trail to Insure Against Contested Ballots

Addressing concern over contested electors like in 2000, improvements to the polls should be made. How about if the voter can detach a perforated ballot stub just like a concert ticket where the stub has a matching number or barcode to the ballot? Voters should opt to put a string of innocuous information on their own ballot to strengthen their 'ownership' claim. This string could be attributes such as: gender, height, hair color, eye color, shoe size -- whatever. Then if there is any problem with the system, voters can return and verify their choices. Voters should also be able to verify the log of their choices in the election database via methods that guard voter privacy and secure against hacking and fraud.



Impartiality Towards Methods

Here's some general advice: When considering certain options for implementing the above reformed electoral college, consult the impartialities of mathematicians and statisticians as opposed to undue special interests, overly partisan and bipartisan commissions and gerrymanderers. If you cannot decide on one method, compromise by alternating methods every election or use some sort of social demographic indicator as when to switch methods.



Comparison

Now compare both of our proposals: the original (Bicam I) and this appended version (Bicam II) to the national popular vote argument. Overall, our plans should bring more consistency and balance in choosing presidents. We think you need an electoral system that is keeping powers in check and making candidates really do their homework in approaching and then governing as president on behalf of your state. Plus, presidential campaigns will become less banal with wider competition as they should be.









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~ COMPARISON TABLES ~






ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED
State Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation
(Electoral House & Senate Method)
AL 9 8.66 9.59
AK 3 1.24 5.89
AZ 10 9.89 10.21
AR 6 4.95 7.74
CA 55 65.55 37.97
CO 9 8.66 9.59
CT 7 6.18 8.36
DE 3 1.24 5.89
FL 27 30.92 20.70
GA 15 16.08 13.30
HI 4 2.47 6.51
ID 4 2.47 6.51
IL 21 23.50 17.00
IN 11 11.13 10.83
IA 7 6.18 8.36
KS 6 4.95 7.74
KY 8 7.42 8.98
LA 9 8.66 9.59
ME 4 2.47 6.51
MD 10 9.89 10.21
MA 12 12.37 11.44
MI 17 18.55 14.53
MN 10 9.89 10.21
MS 6 4.95 7.74
MO 11 11.13 10.83
MT 3 1.24 5.89
NE 5 3.71 7.13
NV 5 3.71 7.13
NH 4 2.47 6.51
NJ 15 16.08 13.30
NM 5 3.71 7.13
NY 31 35.87 23.17
NC 15 16.08 13.30
ND 3 1.24 5.89
OH 20 22.26 16.38
OK 7 6.18 8.36
OR 7 6.18 8.36
PA 21 23.50 17.00
RI 4 2.47 6.51
SC 8 7.42 8.98
SD 3 1.24 5.89
TN 11 11.13 10.83
TX 34 39.58 25.02
UT 5 3.71 7.13
VT 3 1.24 5.89
VA 13 13.60 12.06
WA 11 11.13 10.83
WV 5 3.71 7.13
WI 10 9.89 10.21
WY 3 1.24 5.89




DC 3 1.24 5.89


*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed to the minimum allotted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes" where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate.



CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED

Congressional House Representatives = 435, Senators = 100
Electoral College Electors = 538 (3 for D.C.)
Bicameral II House Denominator = 436 (added one for D.C.)
Bicam II Senate Denominator = 51 (added one for D.C.)


Bicam II National 'House' or 'Senate' Electors:
538/2 = 269

Current Electors Per State:
(state's # US house reps) + (state's # US senators)

National Popular Vote's Effective Range Elector Allocation:
(state's # US house reps / 435) X 538

Bicameral Electoral College II Elector Allocation:
(state's # US house reps / 436) X 269 + (269/51)



Electors are rounded to two decimal points in the table for mere simplicity. They will be carried out to significant digits in execution.






As you can see, the popular vote method is backward since it gives additional electors to states who already have sizeable advantages while it takes away votes from small states who already have little voice in the electoral college. Bicameral Electoral College II does the opposite. It gives more votes to small states by allocating a base number of equal votes to all states before allocating the other half of the votes by population. Our current all-or-nothing electoral college method is somewhere in between while awarding results for most states totally to only one candidate. Our first proposal, Bicam I, allocates electoral vote strength the same as the current method but halves each state's electors between the state legislature and the state's popular vote and rounds off proportional suffrage for candidates in each state. Bicameral Electoral College I can be used in lieu of or until all states implement Bicameral Electoral College II. Remember in Bicam II that fractional allocations and partial electoral vote results are combined and sorted amongst the states to eventually reach a number of whole electoral votes for all candidates after the scrap mixed-share electors are processed separately.

While the larger states do lose noticeable electoral votes in the Bicameral II method, they are still a few magnitudes above the smaller states and do not lose relatively much influence in that regard. Notice too that the spreads between the larger states are narrowed...



SOME LARGE RIVAL STATE SPREADS COMPARED
States Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation
(Electoral House & Senate Method)
CA 55 65.55 37.97
NY 31 35.87 23.17
SPREAD: 24 29.68 14.80
CA/NY: 1.77 1.83 1.64








CA 55 65.55 37.97
FL 27 30.92 20.70
SPREAD: 28 34.63 17.27
CA/FL: 2.04 2.12 1.83








NY 31 35.87 23.17
FL 27 30.92 20.70
SPREAD: 4 4.95 2.47
NY/FL: 1.15 1.16 1.12








TX 34 39.58 25.02
PA 21 23.50 17.00
SPREAD: 13 16.08 8.02
TX/PA: 1.62 1.68 1.47



Keep in mind the partial suffrage in each state of the proposed bicameral electoral college and how that will effect the incentive of the duelling candidates as opposed to all-or-nothing allocation. Now solely considering elector strengths, we note in the above table that while the spreads between the big states are narrowed with still comfortable leads for the bigger states, the comparative large state magnitudes remain near stable throughout in most cases or exhibit a substantial retention. This is like the best of both worlds -- big states are more competitive with bigger states by electoral spreads while bigger states can retain most of their relative advantages. So despite California losing a substantial number of electoral votes and having its lead over other rival big states narrowed (Bicams II & III), California still yields a lot of influence in the new system compared with all states. For compensation, California interests can opt to persuade the other states' legislators since all state legislatures will determine almost half of the national electoral college (w/ DC). California may also consider influencing the popular presidential vote in other states or the state legislative races themselves in various states. Since the smaller states will have higher elector to population ratios, would these approaches save on campaign dollars to achieve the desired electors? Or whatever dollars spent, do campaigns get more for their money within this system in pursuit of a better nation?

The Bicam II electoral proportions for California and the other states are nearly the same as to what they have agreed to in the Congress. Since the proportions work well for the states in choosing our national legislation, why would they not agree to use similar allocations in choosing presidents?........




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BICAMERAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE III



Popular & Legislative Elector Proportions Check House & Senate Representations

Bicameral II is a good system since it gives the states about the same amount of representation in the electoral college that they have in the Congress while emulating a house and senate structure. While Congress deals with the passage of bills which are inanimate, congressional representatives are chosen and respondent to their constituencies of much smaller size than the total presidential constituency. Thus the people have some interactive access and influence to the direction of the federal government in the passage of bills. As a collective the representatives can steer legislation on behalf of the people by each district. Somewhat similar can be said of senators though their domain is statewide. Currently they are elected and swayed by their state populations but all senators have equal representation regardless of the size of their state. Ideally, they would have been indirectly determined by the people through the elected state governments.

Anyway, the office of president has a very large constituency that consists of all those districts and states and there will be only one officeholder who will be even more difficult for the voters in sparser states to reach against the masses. That officeholder will sign or veto bills passed by those senators of equal weight from states of varying sizes and likewise bills passed by the population-based House. A presidential electoral structure that serves as a check on those equal and population characteristics of the congressional houses may be desirable for the executive branch. As well, we note that Bicam II's near congressional intrastate proportions while acceptable for the counterpart senators and representatives may not carry over as ideally in getting the attentions of presidential candidates though they are an improvement over the current system and Bicam I in some respects. Notice that with Bicam II's legislative half, the smaller states may feel that their popular vote towards the president is squelched by their noticeably larger legislative vote and vice versa for the larger states. Accordingly we here put forth a Bicameral Electoral College III.

Bicameral Electoral College III will be a combination of Bicam I and Bicam II that has the same electoral allocations to the states as Bicam II but gives equal voice to the legislative and popular vote within each state like in Bicam I. The total standing given to each state is almost what it is in Congress since D.C. acts as a state and obtains its share through Amendment XXIII.

With Bicam III the president is determined by an electoral system that addresses all the concerns stated previously in the second paragraph. In Bicam III you will notice that the smaller states' popular vote is enhanced and the larger states' legislative vote is enhanced while both voting blocks are equal to each other within each state and so getting same consideration by a president or candidate for a particular state. The national total electoral vote is still half-and-half legislative and popular as it was in Bicam I & II. So by the observed enhancement inversions, certain popular or legislative voices are more competitive state to state and within a state. Bicam III may also work as a check to the congressional side since bills over there emanate from senators as equals and dually from a representation proportionally allotted amongst the states. Inversely, Bicam III will lean toward a president who may be more conscience of passing legislation on governments indexed to states of various sizes while accounting for the more compensatory/competitive shares of the states' popular vote. This is all the while retaining the states' foundational equal footing and their just advantages by population in their overall electoral allocations.

Some states may opt to still use the Bicam II method from within for whatever reasons (gerrymandering issues, countering corruption in a legislature, voter irregularities). This is feasible and fine. A little variance is good and may keep things interesting and the candidates on their toes. And yes, we envision each legislative vote to be the average of the proportions of each house.



Choosing Vice Presidents

Since the electoral college electors are instructed to vote on separate ballots for the offices of president and of vice-president, the popular and legislative votes should effectively do likewise by having those offices appear as separate races on any single ballot. This follows the example of some political third parties who carry out an analogous protocol in the selection of vice-presidential candidates. This arrangement would provide more choice and make way for an intriguing check on the office of president or it could embed a needed political readjustment in case of a succession of power. Presidential candidates may opt to endorse a particular vice-presidential candidate or still pick a mate dependent on the bylaws of their particular party, but the people and state legislatures would determine the vice-president in the end despite party affiliations. Each presidential campaign camp should in addition to their core electors find enough reliable and state-registered presidential electors for their own candidate who will also support all the possible vice-presidential candidates. Some mixtures may be odd or harder to find, but if enough show up in the general election results then there should be enough as well in the elector harvest fields. Thus, the electoral college will ideally be poised to reflect the presidential and vice-presidential results of the election.

Old or New Legislatures?

Should the old or the new legislature determined via the presidential election in question produce the state's legislative electoral vote? One could make cases for both scenarios. Perhaps both can do it by averaging their votes together. Or maybe a candidate-weighted method should be used similar to how states with senatorial districts determine their state senators as described in Bicam II's enclosed section.

Rural or Urban Adjustments?

Further still, your legislature may also consider this mode of operation: In a state where there is a higher extreme ratio of urban to rural presidential districts (or for any other districts used in presidential elections) then that state's popular vote by district may weigh the rural districts a bit more in similar notion to how the national electoral college compensates the smaller states. Conversely, make the urban districts' weights higher for the extreme rural to urban states. Such would occur in a state when its metropolitan areas' issues are not as noticeable to the national media which may tend to cover that state's stereotypical rural concerns. In the more developed states, the opposite may happen when the media concentration, access and attention takes place in the more cosmopolitan areas and not as much in the rural.

Additionally, such adjustments to rural or urban weights could more aptly apply to the particular counties within a state analogous to the nation's overall electoral college compensatory structure. It may turn out that the ratios are not as described above nor prerequisite and that the adjustments are more dependent upon whether or not the concentration, access and attention of the media or of the powers or populace that be within a state are notably unbalanced. As well, the controversy may be over other attributes besides rural or urban. Regardless, the determination of adjustments (if any) should be kept guarded against arbitrary or more trivial justifications and not too large in magnitude.





We leave it to you to discuss and determine how your state will perform such tasks.









NOTE: In concert with the bicameral electoral college plans, we strongly promote the adoption of range voting for any and all elections. Range (or score) voting will be a revolutionary dynamic between representative government and the people. The details of which can be found in the link section following the table below.





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ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED (TABLE II)
State Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* Bicameral Electoral College III Allocation
(Electoral House & Senate Method)
Bicam III Electoral Split
(Half of State's Electors Allocated to Popular/Legislative Vote)
AL 9 8.66 9.59 4.79
AK 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
AZ 10 9.89 10.21 5.10
AR 6 4.95 7.74 3.87
CA 55 65.55 37.97 18.98
CO 9 8.66 9.59 4.79
CT 7 6.18 8.36 4.18
DE 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
FL 27 30.92 20.70 10.35
GA 15 16.08 13.30 6.65
HI 4 2.47 6.51 3.25
ID 4 2.47 6.51 3.25
IL 21 23.50 17.00 8.50
IN 11 11.13 10.83 5.41
IA 7 6.18 8.36 4.18
KS 6 4.95 7.74 3.87
KY 8 7.42 8.98 4.49
LA 9 8.66 9.59 4.79
ME 4 2.47 6.51 3.25
MD 10 9.89 10.21 5.10
MA 12 12.37 11.44 5.72
MI 17 18.55 14.53 7.26
MN 10 9.89 10.21 5.10
MS 6 4.95 7.74 3.87
MO 11 11.13 10.83 5.41
MT 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
NE 5 3.71 7.13 3.56
NV 5 3.71 7.13 3.56
NH 4 2.47 6.51 3.25
NJ 15 16.08 13.30 6.65
NM 5 3.71 7.13 3.56
NY 31 35.87 23.17 11.58
NC 15 16.08 13.30 6.65
ND 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
OH 20 22.26 16.38 8.19
OK 7 6.18 8.36 4.18
OR 7 6.18 8.36 4.18
PA 21 23.50 17.00 8.50
RI 4 2.47 6.51 3.25
SC 8 7.42 8.98 4.49
SD 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
TN 11 11.13 10.83 5.41
TX 34 39.58 25.02 12.51
UT 5 3.71 7.13 3.56
VT 3 1.24 5.89 2.94
VA 13 13.60 12.06 6.03
WA 11 11.13 10.83 5.41
WV 5 3.71 7.13 3.56
WI 10 9.89 10.21 5.10
WY 3 1.24 5.89 2.94





DC 3 1.24 5.89 2.94


*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed to the minimum allotted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes" where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate.



CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED

Congressional House Representatives = 435, Senators = 100
Electoral College Electors = 538 (3 for D.C.)
Bicameral III House Denominator = 436 (added one for D.C.)
Bicam III Senate Denominator = 51 (added one for D.C.)


Bicam III National 'House' or 'Senate' Electors:
538/2 = 269

Current Electors Per State:
(state's # US house reps) + (state's # US senators)

National Popular Vote's Effective Range Elector Allocation:
(state's # US house reps / 435) X 538

Bicameral Electoral College III Elector Allocation:
(state's # US house reps / 436) X 269 + (269/51)

Bicam III State Legislative & Popular Vote Split:
(state's # Bicam III State Electors) / 2



Electors are rounded to two decimal points in the table for mere simplicity. They will be carried out to significant digits in execution.







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LINKS




Here are a few sites that have more information about the electoral college, presidential elections and election systems in general.



Elections Central contains historical facts, popular and electoral results of past presidential elections. There are also a few essays on election topics.

Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections has various election maps for primaries and caucuses of the country broken down state-by-state and in various graph forms as well. Analysis and predictions for current races are also featured.

Election Results 2008 - The New York Times presents results of the 2008 elections displayed on a zoomable US map with state, county tallies and voting shifts from previous elections.

Maps of the 2008 US presidential election results ~ This site posted by a university researcher shows the usual red/blue state and county maps indicating the presidential election results but also included are cartograms which change the relative sizes of the states or counties by population. One cartogram shows relative sizes of the states by their number of allotted electoral college votes. Another map incorporates red, blue or purple hues to indicate a more sliding scale representation of the tallies by county in its cartogram.

PresidentialElection.com ~ Site description says: 'Non-partisan 2010-2012 Presidential Election information and directory including government, state, and local election information. Our promise is to create a more educated voter and a more responsible government by providing accurate information that is available anywhere in the world.'

Federal Register - Electoral College Home Page ~ Office of the Federal Register's web page on the Electoral College.

Constitution Party - Electoral College Plank: Short of getting a bicameral electoral college, the congressional district approach with two statewide at-large electors is a good fall-back plan and would be a step in the right direction away from the current system.

Center for Range Voting explains range (or score) voting and its superior attributes compared to other voting systems. Range voting is used in olympic competitions. Everyone can express their opinion about all candidates by rating each on a scale without having to worry about impeding their favorite one or 'wasting' votes on underdogs. It encourages more honest results, protects against exaggerations and chooses the best candidate. Results of range voting could determine shares of the bicameral electoral college. Then a majority candidate would be determined from there. Please visit this important site!

Range Vote: A Better Way To Vote ~ A video on the advantages of range voting.





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