| Summary | Bicameral Electoral College I | Bicameral Electoral College II | Bicameral Electoral College III | Electoral College Methods Compared | Rival State Spreads | Electoral College Methods Compared II |
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SUMMARY
Depending on the population size of your state, your state my gain or lose electors in Bicameral Electoral College Plans II and III. However, Bicameral Electoral College I keeps the same number of electors we have now. All the plans introduce proportional representation in each state's elector slate and the total national electors are split with one half representing the popular vote and the other half representing the vote of the state legislatures. Bicam II and III introduce congressional weightings on each state's slate of electors. This will result in fractional elector allocations, but they will be combined and swapped amongst the states and then represented in the Constitution's original elector allocations by adjusting each state's current electors to reflect a congressionalized Bicameral Electoral College winner. Here is a list form of the attributes of the Bicameral Electoral College Plans: * Each state's share of electors is akin to their relative share of power in the Congress -- an electoral college 'house' and 'senate'. (versions II & III) States cooperatively use current elector allocations to achieve this. No amending of the Constitution required. * Legislatures will directly determine half of the total national electoral allocation. * Electors chosen will reflect the candidates' share of various popular and legislative vote allocations dependent on the version implemented. * Fractional and mixed electors are combined/swapped amongst the states to arrive at a whole number result of electors after allocation of the final mixed elector is determined. * Presidential debates in various state legislatures will introduce state issues to presidential selection. * Senatorial appointment and gubernatorial electoral colleges are recommended. It is now important that the state legislatures consider these compensational maneuvers in the selection of presidential electors to facilitate better governance from the victor. Consider how the third-party candidates will effect the outcome of the race in the current system and in alternative systems like the Bicameral Electoral College proposal. Which is more beneficiary overall, more equitable, more fair to the various voters and states? Please take the time to study the plan and its nuances. You will need to know the points to argue for it on your debate floors. For reference, there are state-by-state tables of the plan starting after the middle of this web page. Thanks for your time. |
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First some background: The legislative branch is composed of two houses -- the House of Representatives which allocates representation to each state dependent upon population and the Senate which allows each state to have an equal number of senators, namely two. All legislation must pass approval by both houses and must be signed by the president to become effective law. The president can veto legislation denying its passage, but his veto can be overridden by a 2/3 majority of the Congress via both houses. Such is part of the system of 'checks and balances' that keeps our government self-regulating against undue powers and tyranny or at least impeding them (in theory at least). Having a Senate and a House of Representatives as described above was a compromise which kept small states from being totally drowned-out when voting on national laws while still retaining the just advantage of more populous states which is their greater net representation in the national congress. This bicameral compromise addresses both concerns and splits Congress half-and-half. Each house has a say on national legislation and each effectively has half of the power of Congress when it comes to the passage of laws -- one house votes with states as equals and the other house with states allotted votes according to relative populations. Now if you oppose the electoral college, then you are also opposing the root of the nifty House and Senate compromise. Plus you are opposing its intermediary checks and balances and the opportunity for us to get the states to more closely match the mathematical function of the House and Senate when choosing a president. This is because the electoral college allocates to each state a number of electors for choosing the president which is equal to the number of senators and representatives that state has in both houses. So, if we constantly use this type of allocated representation for the passage of our national laws, why would we not employ similar mathematical principle in choosing a national leader? Actually, the Constitution grants every state legislature the sole power to determine how those allocated electors are selected on behalf of their state to the electoral college. State legislatures used to appoint US senators and they ratify amendments to our constitution. So legislatures choosing presidents is not out of the question. Until 1824, over a quarter of state legislatures were choosing presidential electors. Our earliest presidential races had substantially higher proportions than that choosing electors as opposed to total popular election of electoral college electors as we do today. So as the archival presidential elections show, the founders desired not just checks and balances between government branches, but they also wanted checks and balances between government and the people as well -- functioning in both directions. This is because the founders knew the people could be swayed by radicals and mass movements possibly of tyrants or anti-Christ figures. An electoral college would possibly serve as an obstacle or delay to the acquiring of the presidency by such individuals since electors are not subject to office privileges or re-election nor are they the people voting directly. They can opt to act on their own accord thus serving as an intermediary check on presidential prospects. Electors too are subject to check and balance as they can pay penalties for not providing their promised vote. So when someone is about to essentially become a third of our national government, shouldn't the above elaborate system of checks be utilized on their acquisition of power? Shouldn't that choice be subdivided by states and by state populations just like our national government structure? The privilege granted to you to vote for electoral college electors is an accomodation of your state legislature who feels you can be trusted at this time and thinks the masses are of stable enough mind, within sound reason and perceives the society as functionable and at relative peace. However, with today's goings on you have to begin to wonder if this is still a valid perspective. As stated above the checks and balances can work in reverse direction as well. Say if a group of electors were chosen by a state legislature and that group votes against a candidate where the people feel all this was done in an air of frivolity or without due regard, the people will focus their punishment on the state legislature in the next election. Ideally, legislators with scruples would more likely only take such risk of retaliation if they felt that the people's interests were bent or the Republic faced trouble with a prospective national leader. Before trying to do away with our important electoral college check, consider Canada. They determine their prime minister through the majority or by the plurality of seats won by a particular party in the representative house. While they do have a senate, the representative body is usually where the prime minister is derived from. Since this house is based on population, the national leader and the executive direction can solely be determined by the more populated eastern provinces while the western provinces garner substantially less influence. Thus, their national leaders are more skewed towards the views and concerns of the big east provinces. This is one reason there are growing secession sentiments and movements in western Canada. Without more electoral college balance, America may suffer in a similar fashion with New York, California, Texas, Florida and several other big states solely determining the criteria for president. It would be even worse without an electoral college to give some boost to the smaller states. Right now, the current electoral college form usually does agree with the popular vote most of the time except for a few occasions. So why should popular vote purists bother to get rid of it altogether? The few times it has diverted from the popular vote it was probably a needed check to do so. If you wish to complain about the electoral college, you should do so by focusing on the method your state legislature allows for elector selection. Mathematically, most states employ the all-or-nothing mode whereby all electors to the electoral college for a state are unanimously determined by winner of the state's popular vote. There are some advantages to having all-or-nothing in the current system. It will make candidates for president cater more strongly to the interests of your state or its majority based on your state's electoral points. If your state is a smaller state it keeps you more competitive with the larger ones within that system. However, what if an opposing candidate wins? If they only have support of the minority in your state, they will have less incentive to accomodate your state in governing. If it is not as close a race in your state, will they opt to campaign in other states instead of vying for your state? Will candidates see your state as one big blob and carry a watered-down, insincere, common denominator stance towards you or would it be better if they could appeal more to the various regional issues in your state? We'll let you consider the pros and cons as there are many possible outcomes. Technically, the current all-or-nothing system may have been useful back in the day when travel was harsh, there were no instantaneous mass communications and there were no computers. Today, however, all of these exist. Thus more regional interests could shape races and hold sway in close elections. Candidates would take interest in your state whether or not they have a 51% majority. Perhaps the current elector proportions acted as an imbedded populist check on early state governments choosing electors when states held more sovereignty and the federal government was smaller in size and relative power. Strength wise the smaller states are boosted but there is a stronger leaning towards population share than in the congress. For advancement, one plan we would consider is adhering the electoral college selection to mimic more closely the proportions and original principle of the Senate and House compromise on the passage of laws. So, during normal peaceful times with the masses of sound mind we would encourage each state to choose its allotted electors by allowing half to be determined by the state legislature. The other half would be chosen such that the proportion nearly reflects either the popular vote of the state by congressional (or smaller) districts or just the popular statewide vote. The former by district is more of a demographic method that reflects political distribution and densities and political trends. It may indicate how a state politically operates at a closer level. The district method has its advantages and is consistent with how U.S. House Representatives are selected. However, the district method could conceivably vary greatly in outcome from the popular statewide vote more towards unanimity (during a close race with near even district distributions favoring one candidate across almost all districts). Thus, the latter method of employing the statewide popular vote result to the second half of electors presents an option. One may prefer this option as a check or counter balance to the district method that is used for the actual House selection. It also acts as a counter to the concerns of gerrymandering. Still one may prefer use of the district method to strive for consistency with the congressional selection scheme. It depends on numerous circumstances whether one method better reflects regional interests of a state. Regardless of either option, another version of the plan is to allow a third of the allotted electors to be selected by the state supreme court. Should some electors be chosen by a governor? It is interesting in itself to debate the possibilities. The advantages to this plan are substantial for consideration. The nation would less likely be held hostage to just a few swing states during close elections. The other several states would be more empowered because electors from each state are also allocated by state legislatures which brings state concerns and issues to the table plus more emphasis on regional topics. So the smaller several states have a greater number (and perhaps proportion) of state governments for candidates to contend with and to be discerned by as opposed to just dealing with the fewer larger ones. State legislators would gain with their races garnering more attention since they will have an effect on presidential outcomes which means voters have more incentive to turn out for state level elections. Overall, voters are more adequately represented using the conjunction of intrastate popular or district vote along with the voter-determined state legislatures choosing electors. This is opposed to the current all-or-nothing popular vote across a state currently in use. There is a caveat to our plan. Originally, the U.S. Senate was intended to be comprised of senators who were chosen by state governments so that state governments would have representation and a check with the federal level. They also would have a check and balance with the direct representatives of the people elected to the House. Today, we have no such thing since we elect senators by popular vote. Despite the Senate having some unique impeachment and mathematical functions, this popular vote results in a two-house redundancy check-and-balance wise. Also, wouldn't senate appointments by state insulate against large statewide, big-money campaigns that many complain about? With the case being that the general populace has total monopoly in voting for the legislative and executive branches and perhaps until we re-establish state appointment of U.S. senators -- then the electoral college should be determined totally by state legislatures. State legislatures need some amount of voice and power returned to them at the federal level. Once senatorial appointment is resumed, then our aforementioned plan of combining popular vote with legislature determined electoral college electors half-and-half by state would be initiated. (During the period of state legislatures totality, you will still have voice towards presidential selection because you determine the make-up of your state legislature. As noted above, popular vote determines 2/3 of national government, the states 0/3. By this caveat, that would rebalance it 1/3::1/3) At any rate, we support the preservation of the electoral college while considering revamping it at state level to more closely resemble the congressional House and Senate compromise taking into account their effective bicameral proportions. TAKE SPECIAL NOTE OF THIS: We consider the current times to be thwarted, skewed and have long been unfairly biased in favor of the Republican and Democrat candidates for decades through government campaign funding and manipulated ballot access. Thus to make up for all the years of untrue elections, we believe it fair and proper that for the next presidential election all of you pressure your state legislatures to allow only the selection of third party and independent electors for president (or at least vice president) in the electoral college. This is on account of the long past and current electoral grievances. This would be a proper, compensatory check and balance. |
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A sizeable number of state legislatures are considering a pact where the several states will choose presidential electors in such a manner that the electoral college merely reflects the national popular vote outcome, thereby nullifying the electoral college's numerical properties. The arguments for this are that swing states of the current system beckon too much influence and that the current all-or-nothing allocation of electors by each state does not reflect a particular state's voter proportions. They also argue that the smaller states are still too overshadowed by the larger states. We agree with the first two current system disadvantages and thus have instituted our own electoral college proposal above. We also concur with the third concern of smaller state representations as far as the current all-or-nothing scheme. However, one reason why the electoral college exists to begin with is to compensate for the smaller states representations. It boosts the proportional share of votes for the smaller states by allocating two extra electors for every state (by Senate representation) along with the population based elector allocations (by number of House representatives). Resorting to a national popular vote will in fact erase that extra boost for the smaller states. Obviously, a popular vote will cater more to the larger states proportion-wise since they have larger populations and thus more votes weighted in a popular election. Note too that our checks and balances distribute power not only amongst three branches of government, but also amongst a hierarchy of national, state, local governments and the people. Our national laws are voted in through a house of popular representation and concurrently through a chamber where the states sit as equals -- both arrangements splitting the national legislative power equally. Having the senatorial side selected by the state governments was the ideal notion of state governments keeping check on the people and on the higher leveled national government. Our original electoral college proposal (Bicameral I) is similar to this except that the comparative powers amongst the states weigh more towards relative population while still retaining electoral boosts for the smaller states. A national popular vote however, would simply negate those electoral boosts and provides no venue for state governments. The national popular vote scheme also negates any way for an effective Senatorial electoral college even if it was to be popularly derived as we do our national senate today. In our proposed electoral systems, the state government selection of electors for a president will be between you and your state legislature. In other words, you vote for president in more than one way. Your vote for the state legislature offices is also a vote towards a presidential selection. Thus how you govern your state will also influence the direction of the national executive branch. Once total senatorial appointment is achieved, this principle will also eminate from your county seat. And though we have emphasized the boosting of the smaller states in the electoral college, this may be an advantage to the large states too. Now they will not have to solely rely on countering their other big rivals themselves while smaller states would have been of little help on the few-elector sidelines. Henceforth, a large state can convince smaller, more influenced states and their equal representations in the electoral college senate to help counter a more populous rival state in the electoral college house. So don't have a cow California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania & Florida! Seek influence on the near or border states that you have commerce with or those that simply may share a common concern. Those campaign dollars may obtain more electors towards your goals in the smaller states because of the higher proportion of electors to their populations. Still, the bigger states will have noticeable influence just like they do in the Congress with its similar proportions. And further, in order to eliminate any aggregate round-off error amongst the states' tally and to more accurately represent the choice of the people -- all fractional, partial and whole elector allocation results of the states ( & D.C.) will be combined and sorted which will result in a final 537 whole spoken for electors plus one final mixed share elector -- the "hot potato". This resulting final mixed elector will remain one of D.C.'s electors.* This "hot potato" will be awarded as a whole to the candidate who would have had the highest value of electoral votes if the final tally of all electors had been able to divvy up that last mixed elector. However, if the result after divvying up the final mixed elector does not clearly determine a winner of the highest electoral vote value (their differences being within a margin of error or they just have a plain tie) then the final elector regarding the tied candidates will be determined by the House of Representatives in a manner similar to the application of Amendment XII and the Senate will do likewise in an analagous situation for the vice-president. Should the House (or Senate) decision be tie, then the Supreme Court will determine the final elector allocation. If that too be a tie, then the tied candidates shall draw lots to determine who will get the allocation. Concerning the convening of the electoral college, if there is no final electoral vote majority and/or if there was no applicable final mixed elector (the fractions cancelled out) then the presidency is determined by Amendment XII which is designed for such events. *For greater ease in application, an average of the states' votes within the house & senate Bicameral II scheme can be calculated and then applied uniformly across all states' current elector allocations and then swapping partials and fractionals down to the resulting final whole mixed elector in D.C. This will yield the same numerical result for the election. Still, some states may want to have more reflective results of their own tallies or to display whole elector 'samplers' of the candidates who reached a certain threshold percentage in their state. Various routines with more swapping and calculation can be agreed to amongst the states all while retaining the same end national elector counts for the candidates.... And while still retaining those national elector count results, states may also wish to employ as some of their electors for the presidential camps those who have been previous residents of other states. Such appointments may be done in appreciation of larger states accepting the plan or by larger states to display the congressional proportions of smaller states they carry. Such a method may yield a more well-rounded, national background choice for president especially if the electoral college vote comes down to a wire decided by a certain subset of electors. The several states may wish to mutually determine their previous resident elector proportions. Here's some advice: When considering certain options for implementing the above reformed electoral college, consult the impartialities of mathematicians and statisticians as opposed to undue special interests, overly partisan and bipartisan commissions and gerrymanderers. If you cannot decide on one method, compromise by alternating methods every election or use some sort of social demographic indicator as when to switch methods. This plan's appointment of senators and its house & senate electoral college should also be applied at the state level in regards to state senators and gubernatorial races respectively. States may opt to let current state senators stay in office and run for successive terms on a yes-no popular vote basis. If they lose office or resign, then the county seat in question can begin appointing senators. Of course, unicameral state legislatures can remain as such. However, a state like Nebraska may wish to have their unicameral state senators chosen half by the people in the districts as they do now and the other half of the choice by the various county commissioner races, emulating the bicameral electoral college and using weighted representations for those races as described in the section ahead. Such a method will introduce a check on behalf of the local governments. {You may skip the following enclosed section if your state does not use senatorial districts for its legislature.} Concerning the appointment of state senators for states with senatorial districts, we
put forth this new method which is even more unconventional than the previous version
yet it seems to be the only conceivable fair method at this point. So, for this argument, we assume county commissioner districts parcelled by
near equal populations and senatorial districts which may cross county lines and
may even divvy county commissioner districts. Thus for states employing such senatorial districts,
those districts will appoint state senators by the following criteria:
The powers of at-large and district-bound commissioner candidates will be properly combined to reach a conclusion for a state senator. Notice that the candidates may or may not be the county commissioner officeholders for the districts and areas in question. Observe as well that candidates from different counties may be voting for state senator within the same senatorial district which has crossed county lines. It is also possible for candidates to partake in more than one senatorial district appointment process, but again with relative weights toward each function. Returning to the selection of the chief executive, there should be real presidential debates held in various state legislatures where none of the participating presidential candidates are a state resident or have notable work or home relationships with those states. The legislators will present questions to the candidates concerning state issues and how a candidate will lean in federal-state relations. Should political parties adopt the attributes of the bicameral electoral college in their state-by-state delegate selections towards their national conventions?
Addressing concern over contested electors like in 2000, improvements to the polls should be made. How about if the voter can detach a perforated ballot stub just like a concert ticket stub where the stub has a matching number or barcode to the ballot? Voters should opt to put a string of innocuous information on their own ballot to strengthen their 'ownership' claim. This string could be attributes such as: gender, height, hair color, eye color, shoe size -- whatever. Then if there is any problem with the system, voters can return and verify their choices. Voters should also be able to verify the log of their choices in the election database via methods that guard voter privacy and secure against hacking and fraud. Now compare both of our proposals: the original (Bicam I) and this addended version (Bicam II) to the national popular vote argument. Overall, our plans should bring more consistency and balance in choosing presidents. We think you need an electoral system that is keeping powers in check and making candidates really do their homework in approaching and then governing as president on behalf of your state. Plus, presidential elections will become less predictable with more mystery to their outcome as it should be. |
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED |
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| State | Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes | Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* | Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method) |
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| AL | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | |
| AK | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| AZ | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | |
| AR | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | |
| CA | 55 | 65.55 | 37.97 | |
| CO | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | |
| CT | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | |
| DE | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| FL | 27 | 30.92 | 20.70 | |
| GA | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | |
| HI | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | |
| ID | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | |
| IL | 21 | 23.50 | 17.00 | |
| IN | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | |
| IA | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | |
| KS | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | |
| KY | 8 | 7.42 | 8.98 | |
| LA | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | |
| ME | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | |
| MD | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | |
| MA | 12 | 12.37 | 11.44 | |
| MI | 17 | 18.55 | 14.53 | |
| MN | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | |
| MS | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | |
| MO | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | |
| MT | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| NE | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | |
| NV | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | |
| NH | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | |
| NJ | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | |
| NM | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | |
| NY | 31 | 35.87 | 23.17 | |
| NC | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | |
| ND | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| OH | 20 | 22.26 | 16.38 | |
| OK | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | |
| OR | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | |
| PA | 21 | 23.50 | 17.00 | |
| RI | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | |
| SC | 8 | 7.42 | 8.98 | |
| SD | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| TN | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | |
| TX | 34 | 39.58 | 25.02 | |
| UT | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | |
| VT | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| VA | 13 | 13.60 | 12.06 | |
| WA | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | |
| WV | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | |
| WI | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | |
| WY | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
| DC | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | |
*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed to the minimum alloted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes" where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate. CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED
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As you can see, the popular vote method is backward since it gives additonal electors to states who already have sizeable advantages while it takes away votes from small states who already have little voice in the electoral college. Bicameral Electoral College II does the opposite. It gives more votes to small states by allocating a base number of equal votes to all states before allocating the other half of the votes by population. Our current all-or-nothing electoral college method is somewhere in between while awarding results for each state totally to only one candidate. Our first proposal, Bicam I, allocates electoral vote strength the same as the current method but halves each state's electors between the state legislature and the state's popular vote and rounds off proportional suffrage each state. Bicameral Electoral College I can be used in lieu of or until all states implement Bicameral Electoral College II. Remember in Bicam II that fractional allocations and partial electoral vote results are combined and sorted amongst the states to reach a number of whole electoral votes plus one final mixed electoral vote which is then awarded as a whole based on who would win if the final mixed elector was able to be split for the final tally.
While the larger states do lose noticeable electoral votes in the Bicameral II method, they are still several magnitudes above the smaller states and do not lose relatively much influence in that regard. Notice too that the spreads between the larger states are narrowed...
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SOME LARGE RIVAL STATE SPREADS COMPARED |
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| States | Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes | Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* | Bicameral Electoral College II Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method) |
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| CA | 55 | 65.55 | 37.97 | |
| NY | 31 | 35.87 | 23.17 | |
| SPREAD: | 24 | 29.68 | 14.80 | |
| CA/NY : | 1.77 | 1.83 | 1.64 | |
| CA | 55 | 65.55 | 37.97 | |
| FL | 27 | 30.92 | 20.70 | |
| SPREAD: | 28 | 34.63 | 17.27 | |
| CA/FL : | 2.04 | 2.12 | 1.83 | |
| NY | 31 | 35.87 | 23.17 | |
| FL | 27 | 30.92 | 20.70 | |
| SPREAD: | 4 | 4.95 | 2.47 | |
| NY/FL : | 1.15 | 1.16 | 1.12 | |
| TX | 34 | 39.58 | 25.02 | |
| PA | 21 | 23.50 | 17.00 | |
| SPREAD: | 13 | 16.08 | 8.02 | |
| TX/PA : | 1.62 | 1.68 | 1.47 | |
Keep in mind the divvied electors of each state in the proposed national popular vote and of the bicameral electoral college and how this will effect the incentive of the duelling candidates. Now solely considering elector strengths we note in the above chart that while the spreads between the big states are narrowed with still comfortable leads for the bigger states, their relative magnitudes remain near stable throughout. This is like the best of both worlds -- big states are more competitive with bigger states by electoral spreads while bigger states retain relative advantages. So despite California losing a substantial number of electoral votes and having its lead over other rival big states narrowed, California still yields a lot of influence in the new system compared with all states. For compensation, California interests can opt to persuade the other state legislators within the bicameral electoral college system since they determine almost half of the national electoral college via each state. California may also consider influencing the popular vote in other states or the legislative races in various states since those outcomes will determine presidents as well. Since the smaller states will have higher elector to population ratios, would all these approaches save on campaign dollars to achieve the desired electors?
The Bicameral II electoral proportions for California and the other states are nearly the same as to what they have agreed to in the Congress. Since the proportions work well for the states in choosing our national legislation, why would they not agree to use similar allocations in choosing presidents?........
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Bicameral II is a good system since it gives the states the same type of representation in the electoral college that they have in the Congress with a house and senate structure. However, Congress deals with the passage of bills which are inanimate. Congressional representatives are chosen and respondent to constituencies relatively of smaller size. Thus the people have some access and influence to the direction of the federal government in the passage of bills. As a collective the representatives can steer legislation on behalf of people by each district. Similar can be said of senators though their domain is statewide. Currently they are elected and swayed by their state populations but all senators have equal representation regardless of the size of their state. Ideally, they would have been indirectly determined by the people through the elected state government. Anyway, the office of president has a very large constituency that consists of all those districts and states and there will be only one officeholder who will be even more difficult for the voters in sparser states to reach against the masses. That officeholder will also sign or veto bills passed by those senators of equal weight from states of varying sizes and the bills passed by the population based House. By using Bicameral Electoral College II, half of the choice for that president would be determined by a popular vote for electors which is similar to the national popular vote proposal even though that particular half still has some stablizing structure to it. Additionally, with Bicam II's legislative half, the smaller states may feel that their popular vote towards the president is squelched by their noticeably larger legislative vote and vice versa for the larger states. Accordingly we here put forth a Bicameral Electoral College III. Bicameral Electoral College III will be a combination of Bicam I and Bicam II that has the same electoral allocations to the states as bicam II but gives equal voice to the legislative and popular vote within each state like in Bicam I. Since each state's popular vote and legislative vote are equal within and the elector allocation closely matches each state's total weight in Congress, we in effect now have an electoral college 'senate' where each state is equal in the share of 1::1 popular-legislative votes and a 'house' where each state is alloted more share of the same according to relative population. The total standing given to each state is almost what it was in Congress since D.C. acts as a state and obtains its share through Amendment XXIII. With Bicam III the president is determined by an electoral system that addresses all the concerns stated previously in the first paragraph. In Bicam III you will notice that the smaller states' popular vote is enhanced and the larger states' legislative vote is enhanced whilst both votes are equal to each other within each state and so getting same consideration by a president or candidate for a particular state. The national total electoral vote is still half-and-half legislative and popular as it was in Bicam I & II. So by inversion, certain popular or legislative voices are more competitive state to state and within a state. Bicam III may also work as a check to the congressional side since bills there eminate from senators as equals and dually from a representation partialed by similarly sized districts proportionally alloted amongst the states. Inversely, Bicam III will lean toward a president who may be more conscience of passing legislation on governments indexed to states of various sizes while accounting for the more compensatory/competitive shares of the states' popular vote. This is all the while retaining the states' foundational equal footing and their just advantages by population in their overall electoral allocations. Some states may opt to still use the Bicam II method from within for whatever reasons (gerrymandering issues, countering corruption in a legislature, voter irregularities). This is feasible and fine. A little variance is good and may keep things interesting and the candidates on their toes. And yes, we envision each legislative vote to be the average of the proportions of each house. Should the new or old legislature via the presidential election in question determine the state's legislative electoral vote? One could make cases for both scenarios. Perhaps both can do it by averaging their votes together. Or maybe a candidate weighted method should be used similar to how states with senatorial districts determine their state senators as described in Bicam II's enclosed section. Further still the legislature of your state may have another mode of operation in mind. We leave it to you to discuss and determine how your state will perform this task. |
In concert with the bicameral electoral college plans, we strongly promote the adoption of range voting for any and all elections. Range voting will be a revolutionary dynamic between representative government and the people. The details of which can be found in the link section following the table below.
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE METHODS COMPARED II |
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| State | Current All-Or-Nothing Method Electoral Votes | Range Value for National Popular Vote's Effective Electoral Allocation* | Bicameral Electoral College III Allocation (Electoral House & Senate Method) |
Bicam III Electoral Split (Half of State's Electors Allocated to Popular/Legislative Vote) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AL | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | 4.79 | |
| AK | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| AZ | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | 5.10 | |
| AR | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | 3.87 | |
| CA | 55 | 65.55 | 37.97 | 18.98 | |
| CO | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | 4.79 | |
| CT | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | 4.18 | |
| DE | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| FL | 27 | 30.92 | 20.70 | 10.35 | |
| GA | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | 6.65 | |
| HI | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | 3.25 | |
| ID | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | 3.25 | |
| IL | 21 | 23.50 | 17.00 | 8.50 | |
| IN | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | 5.41 | |
| IA | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | 4.18 | |
| KS | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | 3.87 | |
| KY | 8 | 7.42 | 8.98 | 4.49 | |
| LA | 9 | 8.66 | 9.59 | 4.79 | |
| ME | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | 3.25 | |
| MD | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | 5.10 | |
| MA | 12 | 12.37 | 11.44 | 5.72 | |
| MI | 17 | 18.55 | 14.53 | 7.26 | |
| MN | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | 5.10 | |
| MS | 6 | 4.95 | 7.74 | 3.87 | |
| MO | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | 5.41 | |
| MT | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| NE | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | 3.56 | |
| NV | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | 3.56 | |
| NH | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | 3.25 | |
| NJ | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | 6.65 | |
| NM | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | 3.56 | |
| NY | 31 | 35.87 | 23.17 | 11.58 | |
| NC | 15 | 16.08 | 13.30 | 6.65 | |
| ND | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| OH | 20 | 22.26 | 16.38 | 8.19 | |
| OK | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | 4.18 | |
| OR | 7 | 6.18 | 8.36 | 4.18 | |
| PA | 21 | 23.50 | 17.00 | 8.50 | |
| RI | 4 | 2.47 | 6.51 | 3.25 | |
| SC | 8 | 7.42 | 8.98 | 4.49 | |
| SD | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| TN | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | 5.41 | |
| TX | 34 | 39.58 | 25.02 | 12.51 | |
| UT | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | 3.56 | |
| VT | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| VA | 13 | 13.60 | 12.06 | 6.03 | |
| WA | 11 | 11.13 | 10.83 | 5.41 | |
| WV | 5 | 3.71 | 7.13 | 3.56 | |
| WI | 10 | 9.89 | 10.21 | 5.10 | |
| WY | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
| DC | 3 | 1.24 | 5.89 | 2.94 | |
*Effective electors are uniform range value approximations based on the relative number of seats in the congressional house per state. The real world equivalent National Popular Vote elector allocations should deviate from those range values within limit depending on actual state populations and voter turnout election by election. However, any significant difference from the population threshold indexed to the minimum alloted house seat and the requirements of Amendment XXIII could possibly effect real world allocations beyond limit for states like Wyoming and D.C. respectively. Note too that the National Popular Vote takes effect as soon as enough states enter the pact and can assign a 270 electoral vote majority to the "candidate who receives the most popular votes" where those states each grant all of their electors to that candidate. CONSTANTS & FORMULAE USED
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Here are a few sites that have more information about the electoral college, presidential elections and election systems in general.
Elections Central contains historical facts, popular and electoral results of past presidential elections. There are also a few essays on election topics.
Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections has various election maps for primaries and caucuses of the country broken down state-by-state and in various graph forms as well. Analysis and predictions for current races are also featured.
Constitution Party - Electoral College Plank: Short of getting a bicameral electoral college, the congressional district approach with two statewide at-large electors is a good fall-back plan and would be a step in the right direction away from the current system. This method utlilizes the nominal electors in a most appropriate manner.
Center for Range Voting explains range voting and its superior attributes compared to other voting systems. Range voting is used in olympic competitions. Everyone can express their opinion about all candidates by rating each on a scale without having to worry about impeding their favorite one or 'wasting' votes on underdogs. It encourages more honest results, protects against exaggerations and chooses the best candidate. Please visit this important site!
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