In certain circumstances such as all the state representative candidates for a particular district/constituency unanimously supporting only one (type of) presidential candidate or similar for all county commissioner candidates unanimously supporting only one (type of) state senator appointee or when a party's state representative candidate voices their intent to support a diametrically philosophical presidential candidate and similar for their county commissioner candidate's state senatorial choice and/or that potential state senator's vote for president, the states should consider the implications of including another check and balance which may help deter or compensate for such boxed-in scenarios on behalf of the popular voters.

Considering compensations, say for a simple two-way (or majority leaning) state representative race, under that race's section on the ballot there will be a place where the voter can indicate whether they do or do not support their state representative candidate's choice for president. If a majority of the voters for the winning state representative candidate opposed that candidate's presidential choice, then that candidate's presidential choice will not be included in the state's tally of legislative electors for the electoral college. Note that there is no other presidential choice inserted as a substitute towards the state's tally of legislative electors for the electoral college on behalf of that winning state representative candidate's supporters nor for that representative district as a whole. This means the outcome is different than when a more typical race occurs without the circumstances that invoke a compensation.

For two-way (or majority leaning) county commissioner races, voters for such candidates may subsequently oppose on the ballot either their candidate's state senator choice or the presidential choice of their commissioner candidate's intended state senator, both oppositions contingent upon some particular majority of the winning commissioner candidate's supporters voicing nay. Thus, a winning county commissioner candidate's vote towards state senator could be nullified in that tally by a majority of that commissioner candidate's supporters opposing the senatorial choice. The other possibility - the presidential choice of any intended and now state senator-elect would be relatively weakened by the number of county commissioner districts whose commissioners-elect were able to vote that state senator-elect in yet also had of the county commissioner-elect's supporters who agreed with their commissioner-elect's senatorial choice a majority who opposed the intended state senator's presidential choice. One could perhaps ponder a system where the county commissioners-elect as well or by themselves give resistance to their intended state senator's presidential choice while taking into account how that may split the base popular vote, yield a desire for more commissioner candidates, effect any primaries or final ballots and any added complexity or feasibility concerns. We let the readers determine an analogous or more proper method of compensation to be utilized in the cases concerning state senatorial districts whose boundaries divvy county commissioner districts which entails the accompanying weighted representations for commissioner races. {As described in the enclosed section of Bicameral Electoral College II }

Note too that the effects from these compensations on the tallies towards state senator races and any relative powers of presidential choice of same do not work in a fashion to ultimately mimic the mathematical outcomes that an uncompensated race or a straight popular vote would have. We do not want to be very similar to a straight popular vote since we wish for the state legislative races (compensated or not) to influence presidential selection as filtered through local and regional candidates which provides a check against the straight popular votes on the other side of each state's electoral college allotment. This approach also forces voters to weigh local and regional issues against national ones and requires them to think through why or why not consistency in their political philosophy is desirable through the various levels of government. The optional or invoked compensations will act as a release valve in cases where popular voters feel boxed-in by their available state representative or county commissioner race choices or by any resultant state senator appointments which could determine the presidential race's outcome. Another possible reason for these compensations is when the voters feel more concerned about intercepting a particular appointee for a state senate seat but want to avoid concurrently settling for lesser county commissioner candidates in order to do it. Certain campaigns will need to inform voters of strategies such as attempting to intercept a state senatorial candidate through a number of commissioner districts as opposed to just weakening the intended senatorial candidate's choice for president in the case of a close presidential election. There still may be angst and trade-off considering national versus regional outcomes on both sides even with compensations, but the system exhibits more response than without compensation in those boxed-in scenarios. Generally, there are other possible cause-effect situations that may beckon for these compensations which allow more control on behalf of the popular voters toward the legislative electors side without losing the filtration and check via local and regional candidates which would be lost by resorting to a solely popular vote in a straight or effective manner.

When having to utilize these compensations, the further from the majority-leaning race structures (binary or a leading candidate with a proper threshold plurality) at the final ballot the more the concerns over inadequate representation on behalf of the whole district (or for whichever whole constituency) become more apparent. Thus, at some point the more candidates who take significant shares of the vote and still exhibit unanimity across party lines or inconsistencies within party lines, these compensations will not yield desirable representation. To avoid such, it would be better to construct an electoral ballot, system and primaries which furnish sufficient representation for political factions while catering to choices that best provide either the desired consistency from the established parties across the strata of direct and indirect elections and appointments -or- provides opportunities to chose candidates or to yield the appointment of alternates both within or from outside the parties who can function in the intended fashion. Towards such ends, involving open and fair ballot access which allows for more reasonable representation and tug by most political camps across the spectrum while also allowing for the adequate competition within and amongst the various political parties and independents may help prevent the need for these compensations down the road. Conceive as well a primary system that properly and fairly concentrates intent on behalf of the consistencies & political factions from a good canvass of choices. Whatever the primary's ultimate contender limits, it should provide sufficient flexibility and choice at the final ballot which is geared to determine a victor by sufficient plurality or majority. All this can provide a way to limit most of the entrapments as described above which invoke need of compensation.

So we see that compensations are not necessarily a permanent or total solution against the circumstances that induce them. When they are invoked, the voters should then ask themselves if their elections board or their party are not producing enough of the choice or the reliable candidates needed to deflect need of compensations and those voters should begin to examine their ballots for choice or access shortcomings. This is not to say that voters should always expect assurance of ideal carry through to the upward appointments from the state representative and county commissioner races but neither should there be repetitive or perhaps glaringly boxed-in constituencies. Such could be symptomatic of the mentality of the pool of voters one finds themselves in. Nonetheless, compensations can help bring relief and may indicate need of better ballot conditions.

If the election authority who distributes ballots does not want to have to produce multiple ballots - one with no compensations and others with such - they may opt to include them on all and only have the results effective should the pertinent candidates invoke need of compensations because of their stance in their finalization deadlines happening at 1:00am & 2:00am on election day for the state legislator and county commissioner races respectively. When compensations are not invoked, voters may still express their subsequent oppositions and the results tallied as non-binding and referenced by the parties and public as a useful gauge of mandate and political trend. (Or they may be invoked automatically upon a relevenet majority of victor supporters voicing opposition.)