As you can see, the popular vote method is backward since it gives additional electors to states who already have sizeable advantages while it takes away votes from small states who already have little voice in the electoral college. Bicameral Electoral College II does the opposite. It gives more votes to small states by allocating a base number of equal votes to all states before allocating the other half of the votes by population. Our current all-or-nothing electoral college method is somewhere in between while awarding results for most states totally to only one candidate. Our first proposal, Bicam I, allocates electoral vote strength the same as the current method but halves each state's electors between the state legislature and the state's popular vote and rounds off proportional suffrage for candidates in each state. Bicameral Electoral College I can be used in lieu of or until all states implement Bicameral Electoral College II. Remember in Bicam II that fractional allocations and partial electoral vote results are combined and sorted amongst the states to eventually reach a number of whole electoral votes for all candidates after the scrap mixed-share electors are processed separately.

While the larger states do lose noticeable electoral votes in the Bicameral II method, they are still a few magnitudes above the smaller states and do not lose relatively much influence in that regard. Notice too that the spreads between the larger states are narrowed...

Keep in mind the partial suffrage in each state of the proposed bicameral electoral college and how that will effect the incentive of the duelling candidates as opposed to all-or-nothing allocation. Now solely considering elector strengths, we note in the above table that while the spreads between the big states are narrowed with still comfortable leads for the bigger states, the comparative large state magnitudes remain near stable throughout in most cases or exhibit a substantial retention. This is like the best of both worlds -- big states are more competitive with bigger states by electoral spreads while bigger states can retain most of their relative advantages. So despite California losing a substantial number of electoral votes and having its lead over other rival big states narrowed (Bicams II & III), California still yields a lot of influence in the new system compared with all states. For compensation, California interests can opt to persuade the other states' legislators since all state legislatures will determine almost half of the national electoral college (w/ DC). California may also consider influencing the popular presidential vote in other states or the state legislative races themselves in various states. Since the smaller states will have higher elector to population ratios, would these approaches save on campaign dollars to achieve the desired electors? Or whatever dollars spent, do campaigns get more for their money within this system in pursuit of a better nation?

The Bicam II electoral proportions for California and the other states are nearly the same as to what they have agreed to in the Congress. Since the proportions work well for the states in choosing our national legislation, why would they not agree to use similar allocations in choosing presidents?........